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LAWRENCE MILTON HEPPLER

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LAWRENCE MILTON HEPPLER — 1910–1960

LAWRENCE MILTON HEPPLER, professor of Sociology of Religion at Methodist National Seminary, Kansas City, Missouri, and formerly associate professor of Rural Sociology at the University of Missouri, died of a heart attack on Tuesday, November 22, 1960, at his home in Overland Park, Kansas. He was born and reared in Missouri, attending high school at Moberly. He received an A.B. degree from Central College in 1932, and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Missouri in 1940 and 1946, respectively. His teaching career began in 1942 when he served as instructor in Sociology at the University of Missouri. He became assistant professor of Sociology in 1945, assistant professor of Rural Sociology in 1947, and associate professor of Rural Sociology in 1950. In July, 1960, he accepted the position of professor of Sociology of Religion at the new Methodist National Seminary in Kansas City, Missouri.

Dr. Hepple served as president of the Boone County Mental Health Association, and was chairman of the section on Religion and the Aged in the task force created by the State in preparation for the White House Conference on the Aging. He was a member of the Missouri Conference of the Methodist Church, and served as technical consultant for the Department of Research and Survey of the Board of National Missions of the Methodist Church.

He was the author of the book, *Group Organization and Leadership in Rural Life*, and of the series of eight research bulletins on *The Church in Rural Missouri, Midway in 20th Century*, published by the Agricultural Experimental Station at the University of Missouri. These bulletins were the result of a Rockefeller Foundation supported study which he directed. He also contributed numerous papers and reviews to professional journals.

—H. ELLIS PLYLER
University of Missouri
Columbia, Missouri

The Basic Difficulty of Historical Sociology

FRANZ ADLER

THE NEWLY reawakened interest in the sociological study of historical events makes it worth while to raise again the question whether such a study is scientifically feasible at all.

Obviously, all data anybody can deal with are historical data, events of the past. Science is a form of ratiocination dealing with past events and so all science is historical. Seymour M. Lipset suggests in a recent paper, among other things, that quantitative data of the past like census data, election returns, and the survey results of older authors be used more fully by sociologists and historians.¹ There is, of course, no basic difference in using, in 1960, the census data of 1950 and those of 1790, or Kinsey's data and those of LePlay, though the technical quality and richness of information of these sources admittedly differ somewhat. Those who are interested in historical sociology are generally not interested in this kind of work, which falls into the province of general sociology.

The historical sociologist tends to look at history not in the sense of the "totality of all past events," but in the sense of "recorded history."² In other words, he tends to look exclusively, or at least

¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, "A Sociologist Looks at History," *The Pacific Sociological Review*, 1:13-17 (Spring, 1958).

² Compare Simmel's distinction between "immediately lived reality" and "the theoretical construct which we call history."—Georg Simmel, *Die Probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie, eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie*, 3d ed. (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1907), p. vii. Rickert distinguishes between "reality" and the "perception of reality."—Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft*, 3d ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1915), p. 94. Lessing: "History is always a mirroring of life in consciousness, but not life itself."—Theodor Lessing, *Geschichte als Sinngebung des Sinnlosen* 2d ed. (München: Oskar Beck, 1921), p. 22. Proposition V of *Bulletin*

primarily, to the works of the historians as his source of information about unique sequences of past events which he tries to use as raw materials for the development of generalizations about interhuman behavior.

It is the intention of this paper to show that the writings of the historians can be used for sociological purposes only with the greatest caution, if at all. This is not to be understood as an attack upon historians or upon history as a profession. It is merely intended to point out that the aims and methods of the two disciplines differ to such an extent that a transfer of products cannot be undertaken lightly without causing serious damage.

Many modern historians want to be scientists. The methods of ascertaining the individual fact, whether and how it actually happened, is carried out by conscientious historians in ways and by methods which are unimpeachable in terms of any accepted canons or standards.³ In this respect, historians live up to Ranke's demand for telling what actually happened. It is interesting to note, though, that many of today's historians reject Ranke's demand, saying that it is impossible to tell what actually happened. Two main reasons are given for this alleged impossibility: first, that it is inconceivable that all the data of reality could be assembled; therefore, all historical writing and research must be selective, and consequently incomplete as well as influenced by subjective factors; second, that Ranke's aim could be achieved only by applying the method of the natural sciences to history which, according to them, is impossible or undesirable.

As to the first point, that selectivity is necessary, neither Ranke nor anybody else could deny this. "... every written history is a selection and arrangement of facts, of recorded fragments of past actuality. And the selection and arrangement . . . is an act of choice . . . facts . . . do not select themselves or force themselves automatically into any fixed scheme of arrangement. . . . Even if history only publishes

54 of the Social Science Research Council demands that the historian distinguish "the totality of the past" from "written or spoken history."—The Committee on Historiography, Charles A. Beard *et al.*, *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography* (New York, 1946).

³ "In the descriptive function, events that actually took place and the order in which they occurred are identified. This function is 'scientific' in the sense that it establishes credible evidence ('facts') by the critical use of documents."—The Committee on Historiography, Thomas C. Cochran *et al.*, *The Social Sciences in Historical Study*, Social Science Research Council (New York, 1954), *Bulletin* 64, p. 86.

documents, their choice is related to values and interpretation."⁴ Nevertheless, the facts that are reported may, at least in the works of some historians, be considered as reliable. But as they are selected in terms of frames of reference differing from those of sociologists, and as values other than the aims of science (nationalist, political, or esthetic) may enter the selection process, the selected facts, even though genuine, may differ considerably from those a sociologist might select, given direct access to all available information.⁵

Furthermore, history having been set in its ways for quite some time, archives and chronicles have tended toward the preservation of information in line with the historians' interests, to the neglect of data sociologists might need to test their hypotheses. Thus, even the sociologist skilled in the discovery, critique, and use of original documents will often not gain much by circumventing written history and starting from the most immediate sources available.

Huizinga points out that history in contrast to the natural sciences does not want to know everything. The natural scientist wants to be able to account for any event in nature, but history never takes the totality of the events of a past epoch as its object. It selects what corresponds to an *a priori* developed standard of values. Not everything is worthy to be known (*wissenswert*).⁶ Sociology, of course, is as omnivorous as any other natural science and cannot afford to discriminate between relations that are "worthy" and others that are "unworthy" of being known.

Where facts are lacking, historians are more or less willing to supply them. The readers of historical writings since Thucydides have never stopped wondering how apparently extemporaneous orations and anecdotal give and take could be reliably recorded and transmitted in ages lacking in tape recorders and even in systems of

⁴ Charles A. Beard, "Written History as an Act of Faith," *The American Historical Review*, 39:219-29 (Jan., 1934). John Herman Randall, Jr., and George Haines IV ("Controlling Assumptions in the Practices of American Historians," *SSRC Bulletin* 54) consider the historian's choice of his principle of selection as necessarily biased (p. 21); see also Proposition I, same *Bulletin*, p. 134: "... the historian ... aims to compose accurate accounts and analyses of selected portions of the past." Proposition IV approves of this selectivity provided that the author explains his reasons. Proposition VI stresses "the influence of some scheme of reference, interest or emphasis" on the selection.

⁵ Cf. Florian Znaniecki, *The Method of Sociology* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934), p. 210.

⁶ J. Huizinga, *Im Banne der Geschichte, Betrachtungen und Gestaltungen*, (Amsterdam: Akademische Verlaganstalt Pantheon, 1943), pp. 36, 37.

shorthand. At a pre-World War I meeting of the Second International, Leon Trotsky, the linguistic genius of his party, is reported to have undertaken the translation of the speech given by a Nepalese delegate in his native tongue. After finishing the alleged translation, and being asked how he had come to learn to speak Nepalese, he is reported to have answered: "I don't understand a word of it, but what *could* the man *possibly* have said?" Apparently with the same feeling of conviction, at least some historians feel free to furnish speeches and other nonexistent facts from their imagination, particularly if they find this helpful in rounding out some meaningful construct.⁷

It is easy to see how the writing of history here approaches the writing of historical fiction. Guy Endore, a self-conscious historical novelist, says in a sort of methodological note at the end of his fictional biography of Alexander Dumas:

More serious are my inventions of conversations that never took place . . . but note that in every instance these are conversations that should have taken place! . . . but the question is not whether I lied, but whether the conversation, had it taken place, would not have been pretty much as I give it. . . . Actual recorded conversations, even between men of genius, often fail to touch upon essential points. . . . While imaginary conversations are able to go at once to the point. . . .

Ask yourself which brings these men more to life . . . the strict truth, or the invention based upon that truth? . . .

Thus in order to restore to . . . life the truths that belong to it, one is called upon to supply material that is not to be found in any research however thorough. . . .

All the facts about any person will never add up to the living man or woman. . . .

Time will tell whether the lie I have constructed is just an ordinary lie, or whether it is one of those special lies that are truer than the truth. . . . The ostrich who hides his head in the sand is a lie, for no such ostrich exists. And yet that non-existent ostrich is about the only one we talk about, and it has more reality for us than

⁷ Leslie Byrd Simpson, *The Writing of History, A Dialogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), p. 16: ". . . we may use imagination where documentation is lacking"; and p. 21: ". . . the historian must discover the truth . . . after having distilled it by some mysterious alchemy, he must supply the missing ingredients from the stock of his imagination." Simmel (*op. cit.*, p. 40), calls historical constructs "syntheses of phantasy" which have "rational validity" as contrasted to the "accidentality of what merely happens."

the ostrich who still goes on providing man with these useless and unfashionable plumes. If my Dumas should eventually become the real Dumas in the minds of people, dimming or even blotting out the Dumas of the facts . . . then that will be the proof that the lie can sometimes be truer than the truth.⁸

If the assertions of many historians and philosophers of history about the artistic element in history are compared to the above statements of the novelist, it will be hard to repudiate Alexander Dumas père's admonition to a contemporary historian: "Admit, my dear Michelet, that historians are better the more their works read like novels, while novels are better the more they read like history."⁹ It is perhaps an unfortunate fact, but a fact nevertheless, that as Bertrand Russell observes, written history "must be interesting . . . to those who are reading it in the same spirit in which one reads poetry or a good novel."¹⁰ The aim of the historian as a scientist to obtain truth requires circumspection in ascertaining anything as a fact which may be doubtful, the presentation of many possible answers to any given question, and evaluation of all the evidence that strengthens or weakens their respective plausibilities. This aim is contrary to the aim of the artist, which demands that a good story be told with fluency, alternately creating and dissolving tensions, and that it provide arresting details and gripping human interest.¹¹

But we must not impute meretricious motives to the writers of his-

⁸ Guy Endore, *King of Paris* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), pp. 497-504.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 498.

¹⁰ *History as an Art*, (Aldington, Ashford, Kent: The Hand and Flower Press, 1954), p. 10.

¹¹ Russell accuses Herodotus of letting his good stories interfere with historical fact ("How to Read and Understand History" in *Understanding History and Other Essays*, [New York: Philosophical Library, 1957], p. 14), but he states that "there have been real men whose lives had the same quality as that of the great tragic heroes, and had the additional merit of having actually existed" (*History as an Art*, p. 17) without noticing (a) that much of this "quality" is added by the art of the historian rather than discovered by his science and (b) that it may be the very presence of these artistic additions and transformations in historical accounts that make it necessary for him to say: "I do not mean to deny that it is a good thing to discover causal sequences in history when it is possible, but I think the possibility exists only in rather limited fields" (*ibid.*, p. 5). Cf. Louis Gottschalk, Clyde Kluckhohn, Robert Angell, *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology, and Sociology* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1955), *Bulletin* 53, p. 53. Lessing feels that Macaulay's character studies are not in the least different from historical novels (*op. cit.*, p. 35).

tory. Once the artistic approach has been taken, an active transformation of the materials taken from reality becomes necessary. The historian subscribes then to the axiom that "historical truth cannot by any means be considered as a reflexion of historical reality," because history is a work of art in content as well as in form.¹² "This kind of history," Theodor Lessing observes, "does not . . . assert any more 'this is how it *was*!', but it says with clear conscience and with demanding pride 'This is how it *shall have been*!'" The facts have been drowned as well as their true implications, and everything has become "a writers' theme, a meaningful game." Out of this a myth arises which protects man against awareness of the unpleasant facts of past and present reality. Lessing concludes that in this way history and religion have the same escape functions, enabling man to survive in an unpleasant universe.¹³

Karl Lamprecht, a champion of scientific history, felt that there was but a difference of degree between myth (*saga*) and history.¹⁴ A study of medieval historians or even that of some of the ancients (Herodotus or Livy, to name just two examples) shows such close interweaving of traditional myth and fact that the distinction, even if it does not become blurred to the reader, must well have been blurred for the authors. And we find in some of these writings as much apparently purposeful myth-making as in any daily newspaper of our own time.¹⁵

This legerdemain with historical facts can be rationalized by claiming that it is absolutely impossible to ascertain what really happened. This stand is taken, for example, by Simmel who points to the divergence of depositions of witnesses in court.¹⁶ Granted the difficulty of reconstructing facts from such secondary data, we do not seem to hesitate to deprive human beings of life and liberty on this basis. The weakness of the legal as well as of the historical method seems to lie less in the availability of ascertainable facts than in the

¹² Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 55 and 63 (the present writer's translation).

¹³ Lessing, *op. cit.*, pp. 149, 179, 181 (the present writer's translation).

¹⁴ Karl Lamprecht, *Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1896, p. 17). See also footnote on p. 15 which quotes Theodor Mommsen: ". . . Phantasy is the mother of all history."

¹⁵ Hermann Schneider, *Das kausale Denken in deutschen Quellen zur Geschichte und Literatur des zehnten, elften, und zwölften Jahrhunderts* (Gotha: Perthes, 1905), *passim*; see also, as an English example, Geoffrey of Monmouth, *History of the Kings of Britain* (Dutton Everyman paperback, New York, 1958).

¹⁶ Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

methods used for establishing relations among them. Simmel finds philosophical support for his position in a Kantian approach which postulates a "pure reality" as basic to the "experienced reality,"¹⁷ the former being inaccessible by definition. It is unlikely that Kant would have accepted the possible existence of this historical thing in itself as an excuse for the replacement of science by art. While it may be impossible to achieve an absolutely exact reproduction or account of past events, there can be no doubt that closer or more distant approximations can be distinguished objectively on the basis of available evidence.

Let us assume now that a number of works of history can be found in which only actual facts—as opposed to imaginary ones—are reported. These facts are necessarily put in some form of relationship to each other, and it is never easy either in writing or in reading about related facts to separate the facts as such from the relationships which are imputed to them. When we see a man stabbed with a knife and then dying we tend to believe that we observed the relationship between the two facts, namely that the stabbing caused the death by wounding a vital organ. This relationship is not observed but deduced from the general knowledge of the observer. The actual relationship of the stabbing and the death may be a quite different one. For example, the knife may have been a harmless rubber knife and the deceased was a victim of a heart attack brought about by merriment over seeing again his long lost pal, the practical joker. Thus the relationship, may it be argued ever so soundly, is something quite different from fact. Even those works of history that are factually most reliable will differ in their usefulness for sociologists according to the manner in which relationships are established.

"Every historical work that has any coherence is an organization of relationships."¹⁸ Even if the historian should believe that the world is chaos and all order fiction, he would have to organize his account so as to make it intelligible to himself and to others. Whether there is order in the universe or not is scientifically irrelevant as long as we find that the order we impose upon data by overlooking individual differences enables us to deal effectively with

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁸ Charles R. Beard, *The Discussion of Human Affairs* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 61.

the world as we face it. Order, existing in the universe or not, is an indispensable tool of the mind.¹⁹ But as it seems impossible for everybody to agree as to the specific nature of this order, it is the viewpoint of the individual observer which provides the ordering principle for the given work of history.²⁰

Charles Beard sees three major possible orientations in this respect: (1) the total actuality of events is chaotic, without purpose or meaning; (2) historical events are part of some order of nature and show some regularity of cyclical recurrence; (3) history shows a persistent movement towards a more ideal order away from primitive beginnings.²¹ This list is patently incomplete. Teleologies other than those of "progress" are possible, and the course of the world can be seen as well as a continued fall from grace and loss of Paradise. But this does not matter for the present discussion. What matters is that any philosophy of history implies a large number of *a priori* assumptions concerning questions which Randall and Haines conveniently group under three major categories: (1) What is history a history of? (2) What is the nature of its continuity, what is it that continues, where does it start, and where does it go? and (3) Is the development unilinear or multilinear, rectilinear or curvilinear, broken or unbroken?²² That these assumptions are based on philosophic speculations rather than on scientific research need hardly be said.

If the order presented in written history is based on a conception of meaning, it may well be asked to whom this history is supposed to be meaningful. Lessing points out that history tends to be meaningful for the survivor but meaningless for those who were destroyed—"as is well known, however, history is written exclusively by survivors. The dead are mute." Meaning in history is to him a primitive self-reference and self-centeredness, a means of "being

¹⁹ Lessing (*op. cit.*, p. 12) sees "life" (as differentiated from the historical account) as something beyond space and time, in other words outside of any kind of order. Beard (*The Discussion of Human Affairs*, p. 47) feels that "the theory of chaos sweeps away the conception of causation, design, plan, and order in human affairs and denies that they have any 'meaning' in themselves. What we call meaning, it holds, is merely our own 'explanation' or 'interpretation' imposed on the ever-tossing and purposeless occurrences of human life."

²⁰ Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 47; Lessing (*op. cit.*, p. 14) affirms that indeed history is a completely empty form which receives reality only from the historian's desires, sufferings, needs, love, and hate.

²¹ Beard, "Written History as an Act of Faith," pp. 225, 226.

²² *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

able to bear heroically immeasurable amounts of pain and non-ending extermination suffered by others."²³ When Max Weber ridicules the study of Kaffir history, this illustrates the very attitudes Lessing castigates. Weber approves of the study of Athenian history because its events had an effect upon our present day Western civilization.²⁴ But the question may well be asked whether the effect was due to the events themselves or to the fact that we study them. Could we estimate the effects it would have on our world if we should teach our descendants Kaffir history instead of Greek history for the next two thousand years? Apparently, the assumption of meaning, particularly if this meaning is teleologically conceived, tends to imply a value judgment. Insofar as this value-laden meaning determines the questions the historian asks and thus the answers he gets as well as the way in which he organizes these materials,²⁵ his results can hardly be expected to be unbiased.

This problem has been amply discussed by the German school under the heading of "value relatedness" (*Wertbeziehung*). Windelband, Rickert, and Weber insist that the values involved are but the intellectual interests of the historian and his readers and that these form the basis on which problems, facts, and hypotheses are gleaned from the infinity of possibilities. They assure us that these values remain *otherwise* without influence upon the results.²⁶ Meinecke, on the other hand, feels that such a separation is neither

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 53, 54, the present writer's translations. See also Lessing's distinction between "scape goat causality" and "sin causality," explanations referring to the other's or one's own evil doings respectively (p. 49), or Harry Elmer Barnes's distinction between the "sneer method" and the "drool method" of history.—*History and Social Intelligence* (New York: Knopf, 1926), p. 4.

²⁴ Max Weber, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, translated and edited by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1949), p. 172.

²⁵ Huizinga, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Lessing, *op. cit.*, p. 70: "A condition or content which according to the judgment of the historian is to be held useful or desirable is made the provisional terminal point of a chain of historical developments. The events must then be oriented and grouped toward this point." Later (p. 106) Lessing refers the process of relating to approved goals things which happened independently as "*sacrificatio post eventum*," giving the glory and blessing of an approved event to something intrinsically unrelated to it, but which is now designated as its cause.

²⁶ See, for example, Wilhelm Windelband, *Geschichtsphilosophie*, ed. by Wolfgang Windelband and Bruno Bauch, Kantstudien, Ergänzungshefte No. 38, (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1916), p. 41; Rickert, *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung*, 2d ed. (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1913), pp. 316–43; Max Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 33, 34. In his essay "Der Sinn der 'Wertfreiheit' der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften" in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1922), Weber points to the sociology of knowledge implications of the concept of "value-relation" (pp. 474, 483); the existence of cultural limita-

possible nor desirable.²⁷ One might wish to encourage the historian to express his values frankly, administering praise and censure as he goes along. This practice would have the advantage of putting on guard the sociologists using their works. In the case of historians appearing to be impartial but actually choosing, organizing, and presenting their materials on the basis of some extrascientific values, readers might easily be deceived into thinking that they are given the plain facts while actually being presented with a stacked deck of cards from which some aces and trumps have secretly been extracted.²⁸ Scientifically speaking, once the problem to be studied has been decided on—this decision is indeed a matter of private preference of the researcher—the relevance of facts to the problems is not a matter of anybody's value attitude, but an objective question of causal analysis.²⁹

The causal analysis of events is, of course, the most important form of organization of data in history. In fact, historians since Thucydides have generally considered it necessary to present their accounts in terms of cause and effect.³⁰ From a natural science viewpoint,

tions (and stimulations) to knowledge are not specific to history, but are shared by all sciences to greater or lesser degree, and the sociologist studying the data of any science should be aware of them.

²⁷ Friedrich Meinecke, *Schaffender Spiegel, Studien zur deutschen Geschichtsschreibung und Geschichtsauffassung* (Stuttgart: K. F. Köhler, 1948), p. 66: "Even the mere selection of value-related facts is impossible without making value judgments. It would be possible only if the values to which the facts relate would, as Rickert believes, consist only of such general categories as religion, state, law, etc. But the historian does not select his materials according to such general categories, but also according to the lively interest he has in their concrete content. He conceives of them as more or less valuable, that is, he makes a value judgment. . . . Even should the historian formally withhold his own value judgment, it is still there and has its effect upon the reader." P. 230; "History written without valuation . . . is boring" (the present writer's translation). In the same passage Meinecke refers to Weber's "magnificent historical researches and presentations" as examples of "how the involuntary valuation due to the author's temperament adds colors and brings to life" a work of history. See also Beard, "Written History" p. 221: ". . . any written history inevitably reflects the thought of the author in his time and cultural setting."

²⁸ Cf. Lessing, *op. cit.*, p. 69: "History rearranges everything that disturbs the continuity and the ideal of the continuity until it fits into that continuity and, by contrast, everything that cannot otherwise be woven into it logically, is left aside, shut away, and not connected with the rest."

²⁹ Cf. Carl G. Hempel, "The Function of General Laws in History," *The Journal of Philosophy*, 39:35-48 (Jan., 1942).

³⁰ See, for example, Proposition X in *Bulletin* 54, p. 136; or *Bulletin* 64, p. 86: "The scientific function involves not only identifying and describing temporal sequences; it also involves explaining them . . . we mean that we undertake to give reasons for those particular events or, in other words, to explain why they occurred in that particular order. To do so is to make a statement about causation," and p. 88;

in history as anywhere else, . . . the explanation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general empirical laws; and the criterion of its soundness is not whether it appeals to our imagination . . . or is otherwise made to appear plausible, . . . but exclusively whether it rests on empirically well confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions and general laws. A set of events can be said to have caused the event to be explained only if general laws can be indicated which connect "causes" and "effect"³¹

Max Weber shared this view and even asserted that we are able to obtain "absolute and unconditionally valid" knowledge of causes in historical events by subsumation of specific instances under empirical rules (*Regeln der Erfahrung*), that is "rules . . . relating to the ways in which human beings are prone to react under given situations ('nomological knowledge')."³² This knowledge is expressed in general statements which may refer to historical, that is sociological, economic, psychological, and similar matters, but also to meteorological, medical, biological, chemical, and other subjects.³³

A scientific history, a history as Ranke envisaged it, one that has reasonable similarity to what actually happened, undoubtedly depends on the use of such generalizations. Ranke was fully aware of this.³⁴ But it is exactly to this aspect of his demand for realism that his opponents direct their second line of attack (concerning their first line, impossibility of factual completeness, see above). This attack springs from a basically antirational attitude frequently found among German mystics, but by no means absent among others. Thus, Beard calls causation a physicalist concept that implies determinism and demands that we study history not as a science but "as actuality."³⁵ Others categorically declare that it is impossible to gen-

". . . historians have always dealt with problems involving causation and will undoubtedly continue to do so. . . ." Max Weber, *The Methodology*, p. 164: "If history is to be raised above the level of a mere chronicle of notable events and personalities, it has no alternative but to pose such questions. And so indeed it has proceeded since its establishment as a science."

³¹ Hempel, *op. cit.*, p. 45, 37.

³² Weber, *The Methodology*, pp. 159, 173; see also Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 25, and Herbert Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (New York: Appleton and Company, 1884), pp. 39ff, for the same view.

³³ Heinrich Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft*, p. 73. He tends to reject the use of the generalizations of all the sciences, specifically, however, of those of psychology, in favor of artistic intuition (p. 68).

³⁴ Ernst Simon, *Ranke und Hegel* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1928), p. 169.

³⁵ Beard, "Written History," pp. 222-23. In the end, he still recommends, though, that we hold on to empirical and scientific methods which are indispensable (p. 226).

eralize about certain repetitive events like war, tyranny, revolution, dictatorship, or democracy.³⁶ If this were true, no causal statements could be made in those contexts either.

American historians seem to be largely unaware of and consistently silent about the principle that causes can be ascertained validly only where empirically validated general statements exist about the connection of events of the kind in question. German thinkers, on the other hand, have been most vocal in rejecting this principle and in ascertaining that it is indeed possible to discover causes and effects in unique sequences where no recourse to general knowledge can be had. Thus, Rickert distinguishes between the *law* of causality which applies to the natural sciences and the *principle* of causality which applies universally. Thus it applies to individual cases as well as to classes of events.³⁷ The trouble with this view is that here "cause" as a category of the observer and "cause" as a fact of the external world are confused. There is no way of observing the latter by sense perception. We cannot observe the "necessity" of any connection, but we can observe regular sequences and call the antecedent elements in them "causes." If a case is really absolutely unique it could not possibly fit into any regular (repetitive, general) sequence. But no matter how unique any complex event may be, we can look at its components as instances of general concepts and subsume them under general statements. Rickert and others with him deny this possibility and must therefore suggest a different way of obtaining knowledge of causation.

This way is intuition, *Verstehen*. Contrary to Max Weber, who uses intuition only to arrive at hypotheses which need empirical confirmation, others see in it a method of gaining final answers.³⁸ Simmel's conviction in this matter is so strong that he actually asserts

³⁶ Proposition XII, *Bulletin* 54, p. 137.

³⁷ Rickert, *Die Grenzen*, pp. 369ff.

³⁸ Rickert, admitting the impossibility of one human being really entering the mind of another, stipulates that we experience a non-real mental formation (*Sinn-Gebilde*) by projecting ourselves into the other. The approach is nevertheless seen as useful and indispensable and Rickert refers to it as "the miracle of *Verstehen*."—*Die Grenzen*, 5th ed., pp. xi, 533 ff., 577, 585 f., 597 ff.; Eduard Spranger, *Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft, eine erkenntnistheoretische und psychologische Untersuchung* (Berlin: Reuther und Richard, 1905), *passim*; Theodor Litt, *Die Wiedererweckung des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins*, Heidelberg, Quelle und Meyer, 1956, pp. 77 ff. See also Proposition XIII in *Bulletin* 54, which defines "understanding" as a feeling of satisfaction similar to Weber's "evidence." Lessing, by contrast, sees in *Verstehen* an attempt at fitting everything into an existing habit pattern, an attempt that can only

that general laws of causation can be derived from a single case because, as he puts it, if B grows out of A once, it must always do so. But, the cases history deals with being unique, each historical law is valid only for the one situation from which it has been derived except for the unlikely case of absolutely identical repetition. He asserts that we might imagine a world order in which all causes are unique and cannot be stated in terms of general laws.³⁹

Others feel it necessary frankly to abandon at this point any aspiration of being scientific. They emphasize the artistic freedom of the imagination or they see intuition as a step *beyond* science and causation which, though it may not give knowledge of the whole depths of reality, "can by enabling us to achieve a foreboding understanding give us by lively intuition (*Anschaung*) a sympathetic feeling of them."⁴⁰ Finally, some philosophers of history and some historians emphasizing "free will" as being in contradiction with causation, which is said to imply determinism, try to use the category of "purpose" to replace the category of cause. Of course, purpose which exists in the actors before they do what is then recorded in history is but another causal fact, as, for example, Lamprecht has clearly shown.⁴¹ Divine purpose or that of a self-realizing spirit of history, world, time, folk, etc. is still another matter.

While some recent historians consciously conform to one or the other philosophical line in their works, the majority of the historians of the present as well as of the past deal with matters of causality in a common-sense manner. To them "cause" tends to be "a convenient figure of speech describing motives, influences, forces and other antecedent interrelations not fully understood . . . any preceding event in what is assumed to be a consequential and inter-related complex."⁴²

succeed if truth is more or less subtly perverted.—*Op. cit.*, p. 69. Nigel Dennis refers to "the Mustafelt Method," "the great advance that has been made in scholarly biography with the growth of the Must Have Thought or Must Have Felt School of writing."—"Smiling William," *The New Yorker*, May 14, 1960, p. 121.

³⁹ Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 21, 76-78.

⁴⁰ Meinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 61 (the present writer's translation). See also Walter Hofer, *Geschichtsschreibung und Weltanschauung* (München: R. Oldenbourg, 1950), p. 243.

⁴¹ Lamprecht, *op. cit.*, p. 8. It seems, however, that some authors use the teleological free will approach and the causation approach alternately or in combination; see, for example, Hofer, *op. cit.*, pp. 245 ff. Rickert recognizes the teleological element in his concept of "value relatedness."—*Kulturwissenschaft*, p. 101.

⁴² *Bulletin* 54, Proposition XI, p. 137. See also Simpson, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

Common sense is suggested as a means for establishing causation even by some of the most sophisticated thinkers. Thus Rickert as well as Weber feels that in most cases the historian may rely completely on his general prescientific information for the assessment of causation. In fact, Rickert recommends to historians the use of common sense in preference to psychological theories as a safer guide and also because this common sense is shared by many and so explanations based on it will be more widely comprehended than those using scientific concepts.⁴³

Max Weber's idea of the "mental experiment" for the discovery of historical causation stands and falls with the validity of the generalizations available to the historian. The experiment consists in the mental investigation of what would possibly have happened *if* what actually did happen had not happened, but something else had happened instead.⁴⁴ This method will lead to results which are as valid as all of the generalizations on which such speculations are based. Any single invalid generalization used invalidates the whole "experiment." Anyway, "in our present state of knowledge it is probably impossible to establish objective criteria for such speculation in history."⁴⁵

The chance that historians will arrive at valid causal assertions is

⁴³ Rickert, *Kulturwissenschaft*, p. 75; Weber, *The Methodology*, p. 173. See also Simpson *op. cit.*, p. 7, for a similar view by an American writer. Gottschalk points to the behavior of contemporary American historians who seem to have taken Rickert's point to heart, "The Historian and the Historical Document," in *SSRC Bulletin* 53, pp. 56, 57. Simmel asserts (*op. cit.*, p. 24) that "undoubtedly there are very definite rules of this nature [generalizations concerning causal sequences] according to which historians proceed and which are silently presupposed by the historian as well as his reader, but whose conscious statement is still lacking" (the present writer's translation). Hempel criticizes the historians' failure "to include an explicit statement of the general regularities they presuppose; and there seem to be at least two reasons which account for this: *first* the universal hypotheses in question frequently relate to individual or social psychology which somehow is supposed to be familiar to everybody through his everyday experience, thus they are tacitly taken for granted. . . . *Second*, it would often be very difficult to formulate the underlying assumptions explicitly with sufficient precision and at the same time in such a way that they are in agreement with all the relevant empirical evidence available. . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 40); it must be noted that Hempel accuses sociologists of this very same misbehavior, but it may be stated, at least hypothetically, that those among them who use a natural science approach are less frequently guilty of it than historians. Even Ranke's followers, though aiming at a scientific history, had no all-embracing theory of causality but proceeded by means of concatenations of antecedents and consequents without explaining how they selected them from the infinity of past events.—Gottschalk, *Understanding History*, pp. 218, 219.

⁴⁴ *The Methodology*, pp. 164 ff.

⁴⁵ *SSRC Bulletin* 53, pp. 60, 61, and Gottschalk, *Understanding History*, p. 242.

still further diminished by their unwillingness or inability to make use of statistical findings. Even Max Weber, who made frequent uses of statistical data in his substantive work, states that "the adoption of the principles of the so-called 'calculus of probability' . . . is not to be considered for the work of causal analysis in history."⁴⁶ Simmel affirms that "statistical laws" are purely external and lack strength because they are merely the results of other laws rather than laws in themselves⁴⁷—a view which implies a curious reification of inductive generalizations. Many of the problems discussed here would dissolve and disappear if it were more widely understood that scientific generalization in all fields are but statements of probable regularities of sequences.

Historians use a relatively small number of classes of causal factors, always closely related to their philosophies of history. Gottschalk provides a list which, briefly, contains the following: immediately precipitating events; prowess of heroes, priests, and kings; the will of the gods or a divine plan; virtue and sin; the geographic environment; the good or evil nature of man and the struggle between these two characteristics; national character; spirits of the time, the world, the folk, and of history itself; progress and the increasing understanding and control of nature. These by themselves and in combinations imply others, and undoubtedly more could be added.⁴⁸

He specifically points to certain fallacies involved in assessing causes on the basis of notions of "the unity of the historical individual," of "influence," and of "reaction." In the latter two cases, where real proof would be extremely difficult, historians tend to be satisfied by arguments of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*.⁴⁹ The assumption of the unity of the individual—be it a person, a group, a state, a nationality, a class or something else—used to be considered an essential prop of historiography.⁵⁰ Lessing showed the inherent irrationality of such expressions as "the greed of Prussia," "Eng-

⁴⁶ *The Methodology*, p. 167 fn.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

⁴⁸ *Understanding History*, pp. 211–220; *Bulletin* 53, pp. 52 ff.

⁴⁹ *SSRC Bulletin* 53, p. 58–60, *Understanding History*, pp. 233 ff.

⁵⁰ Gottschalk, *Understanding History*, p. 217; Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 26, considers the unity of personality, of the individual, or of the group as an indispensable *a priori* of history; on p. 38, he states that *Verstehen* is impossible without such unity; on p. 77, however, he is aware of the chance of fallacious thinking if the same name or word is used for seemingly identical, but actually diverse phenomena. Rickert (*Kulturwissenschaft*, p. 79) declares that individuality, both in its aspects of uniqueness and in its

land's jealousy," "France's hunger for glory," and refers to "ghost stories about loving or hating abstractions," invented for the purpose of making events appear more reasonable than they are.⁵¹ Gottschalk adds to these, as equally illicit, terms like "Voltaire's religion" or "Napoleon's ambition" which are used "as if they described constants, or at least dominant and easily recognizable things." And where similar characterizations are applied to a whole area, he castigates those who "write of a period of history as if it had a single dominant aspect that made attention to its other aspects unnecessary."⁵²

The sociologist who accepts as factual the causal connections offered him by the historians will indeed be able to arrive at generalizations. He will discover that in the Middle Ages—if he follows the writers of that time—God directly interfered and worked miracles to help his side to win battles and overcome diseases.⁵³ He will find that then as well as today—if he follows the Marxians—everything had and has its origin in the class struggle. But he will find much more consistently that historians use common sense generalizations on which they base their causal statements, though at times these seem to be rather decorative literary asides than serious statements of relationships. Thus, it is unlikely that his generalizations will be usable as bases for the prediction of facts from facts, but more likely for predictions of the way in which historians in general or special classes of historians will explain given facts. Such findings may be used in the sociology of knowledge with great advantage. But for the use for which they are primarily intended they are useless.

Herbert Spencer, who tried to work with historical data (and with certain ethnographic materials which often are also "value related" in that the description of what the society is supposed to be like takes the place of the description of what the society really is like),

aspects of unity (self-identity, permanence), can be known only in immediate intuition; thus (p. 113) Napoleon or Goethe, each represents a unity of life (*Lebenseinheit*) which cannot be explained psychologically.

⁵¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 33, 34: "Who after all does, in the depth of his heart, believe in nations, states, groups, or genera? Who believes in historical motives? Every practical human being feels and knows exactly that he is always going to deal only with others like himself in love or in hate," the present writer's translation. Also p. 17: State, nation, progress, development are not realities, but viewpoints. See also pp. 13 and 113 ff.

⁵² *SSRC Bulletin* 53, p. 58.

⁵³ Schneider, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

knew very well what he was up against: "Very generally . . . the ordinary thoughts of causation are not even qualitatively valid: the most absurd notions as to what cause will produce what effect are frequently disclosed . . . the uncomparred and unanalyzed observations men make in the course of their dealings with things around do not suffice to give them wholly rational ideas of the process of things." And elsewhere he complains: ". . . much has been said about the untrustworthiness of historical evidence . . . one of the impediments of sociological generalization is the uncertainty of our data."⁵⁴

Sociology aims at achieving generalizations which permit prediction and, at times, control. Prediction includes explanation—only that explanation is valid which proffers facts from which whatever has been explained could have been predicted.⁵⁵ History does not provide man with generalizations which he may use to select means for the achievement of ends. It does, however, besides affording plain reading pleasure like a novel, provide certain psychological satisfactions. The reader may forget his own insignificance while participating in the glory of his country or some other country or hero with which he has learned to identify himself. For this purpose the question of truth is not relevant as long as matters are presented in such a way that the untruth is not too obvious. Harry Elmer Barnes may be quite correct in saying that there is "no more monstrous error than the supposition that the human animal lusts after or relishes the truth."⁵⁶

It seems then that the historical sociologist who does not want to work with the statistical data available to him from the last century and a half is out of luck and out of work. This need not be the case, though. He may do some work with the help of original documents so far as these are preserved. But we have already noted the bias effective in their preservation. His real task may lie—quite in line with his interests—in the formulation of hypotheses which can only be answered by long range historical observation. His study of written history as it is has undoubtedly stimulated him to ask some questions and has suggested to him some possible answers. He may then designate the classes of data needed, now and for the centuries to come, by whose collection his hypotheses may be tested. He may

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 319 and p. 75.

⁵⁵ Hempel, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁵⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 3; see also Lessing, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

then proceed to gather the data as they arise in his own lifetime and make provisions so that they may be gathered by others after him. Then, in some not too distant future, there may arise a scientific historical sociology as well as a chance to write truly scientific history, if that be wanted.

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A Functional Analysis of Collective Behavior in a Disaster*

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TORNADO KILLS 31, INJURES 200
Rescue Workers Probe for Other Victims
Property Damage is Enormous as Twister
Rips Path through Populous Suburbs
—*Kansas City Times*, May 21, 1957

TO THE FEW hundred people directly involved, the tornado spelled tragedy. But for many of the remaining million residents of the Kansas City Metropolitan Area it spelled excitement and entertainment. To the sociological observer, viewing the event as collective behavior, several latent functions of disaster appear. It is suggested here that the storm which descended upon the fringe of the city appeared to provide thousands of spring-fever stricken citizens with recreation, occupation, relaxation, and a sense of fulfillment—the kind of collective excitement which offers a welcome respite from the monotonous routine of urban living.

Functions, Dysfunctions, Definition of Disaster

Before examining the above hypothesis, two points should be made explicit. First, the unanticipated and frequently unrecognized consequences of a disaster need not be dysfunctional from the per-

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spective of all of the groups concerned. It is suggested below that there may be important latent functions of a disaster. For example, it would be difficult for anyone to admit to himself that he could find pleasure in the tragedy of others although this is apparently what happened.¹ Nevertheless, in finding their pleasure, many persons were performing effectively, and sometimes heroically, tasks which needed to be done.

The second point concerns a general definition of disaster. If we are to generalize from observations based on one case, then we must be able to recognize other cases (events) which can be expected to exhibit the same qualities and characteristics.² A disaster, from the sociological point of view, is an unanticipated event presenting what is defined by the participants as an immediate threat to their physical selves and persisting for a relatively short fragment of time. It is distinguished from an "accident" in that it involves a sufficient number of people in an unanticipated situation, so that community resources not routinely engaged in such activity need to be drawn upon for relief of the situation and its aftermath.³

Another distinction should be made between a disaster situation and certain others such as the outbreak of war or an acting crowd. The thrill of excitement and expectation prevailing after the announcement of Pearl Harbor or the abortive Budapest revolt of 1956 imply sufficient time for disillusionment and *persistent* danger over an extended period of time. This is not so in a flash flood, an earthquake, a shipwreck, or a tornado. One who survives to hear about such events is physically safe. They do not and cannot threaten his person. The temporal quality is of the essence in disaster.

Sources of Data

The authors, in effect, were participant observers—a part of the million people whose reactions to a disaster are reported here. In addition to our informal observations, there was a systematic in-

¹ One of the present authors first noted this kind of reaction on December 7, 1941, when as a college undergraduate he and his roommate were listening avidly to the reports of Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor. The roommate, a second lieutenant in the Air Corps Reserves, was flushed with excitement and shrieked with delight at each new report of the attack.

² The definition which follows was formulated after a conversation with Jeannette Raynor of the Disaster Research Group, National Academy of Sciences.

³ For example, the head-on collision of two automobiles at a highway intersection

interviewing program of agency personnel who were active in or concerned with the disaster or immediate post-disaster period. One of the writers attended a number of meetings and interviewed members of stricken families. Finally, relevant news stories, human interest items, and advertisements in the local newspapers were clipped and analyzed. Because the more systematically gathered materials were obtained for other purposes, the authors claim no more than an impressionistic arrival at some hypotheses derived from a functional analysis of human behavior during and following a single case of a disaster.

Fun and Profit in a Disaster

It is suggested that several distinct types of "fun" and "profit" behavior were exhibited during and immediately following the Kansas City tornado of May 20, 1957. Some of these behavior patterns have been observed in other disasters, but the emphasis has tended to be on their dysfunctionality rather than the positive functions they might have for the individuals concerned and the community as a whole.⁴

The difference between the present analysis and those rare others in which the cathartic, therapeutic, or functional aspects of disaster have been discussed is that the present focus is not on the few individuals directly involved in the disaster but upon the many on the periphery. It is a focus outside of the immediate impact sphere of the disaster—on a helping world which seemed, in many cases, to obtain satisfactions which can be likened to those of a Lady Bountiful delivering a Christmas turkey to a deprived family. The types of fun and profit behavior observed are examined below.

An Evening's Entertainment. Within a few minutes after the radio and television appeal for medical aid in Ruskin Heights, it became clear that a tornado had touched ground in that area, and

is not defined as a disaster. The highway patrolman who methodically handles the situation did the same thing yesterday and will do it again tomorrow; it is part of the anticipated routine of his daily work. In contrast, the collision of the passenger liners *Andrea Doria* and *Stockholm* off Cape Cod can be defined as a disaster.

⁴ An exception to this general emphasis is found in Fritz's discussion of "therapeutic" features of a disaster. His central theme is that disasters increase family unity. —Charles E. Fritz, "Therapeutic Features of Disaster and Their Effects on Family Adjustment: Some Research Orientations," paper read at the Groves Conference, Washington, D.C., 1958 (typescript), p. 14.

mobile transmitters from local radio stations began relaying disjointed reports to the million people in the surrounding metropolitan area. In the quiet darkness following the storm it was impossible to determine the extent of the damage. Rapidly the main thoroughfares leading to the stricken area became alive with solid streams of automobiles, jamming both lanes and all headed in the same direction. The convergence pattern, long familiar to students of disaster, was in effect.⁵ It is difficult to avoid the impression that these "sightseers" were enjoying themselves. A resident of the stricken area reports that "it made me angrier than anything else that happened. At five the next morning I was up there at the house and whole families would come by in cars—just out idly looking at us like a bunch of caged animals."

In spite of the fact that shortly after 9:00 P.M. all radio stations were urging people to stay away from the stricken area, the mobs continued to pour in. Ten days later the newspaper reported that an estimated 250,000 persons had viewed the effects of the tornado and the police were still having difficulty keeping traffic moving. There is, of course, no way of checking the reliability of such an estimate, but if it is anywhere nearly accurate it means that more than one out of every four men, women, and children in the five-county metropolitan area had come for an outing in the disaster area. It was not uncommon to hear people say, "Let's take a drive out to Hickman Mills this evening," as though they were going to a drive-in theater.

The convergence pattern is not unique to disaster (as defined here): it is duplicated in the streams of traffic that converge on racial trouble spots such as Little Rock, or in decades past, on lynching bees in otherwise quiet Southern towns. Furthermore, it is not unlike the floods of humanity which have historically gravitated toward such phenomena as gold rushes and land rushes. The only attempt to conceptualize this general type of spontaneous collective grouping is the formulation of the "mass" and "mass behavior."

⁵ Cf. Charles E. Fritz and Harry B. Williams, "The Human Being in Disaster: A Research Perspective," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 309:46 (Jan., 1957); Charles E. Fritz and J. H. Mathewson, *Convergence Behavior in Disaster: A Problem in Social Control*, Committee on Disaster Studies Report No. 9 Washington, D.C.; National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1957). A police dispatcher describes that night as follows: "At one time they couldn't get an ambulance through or anything, the sightseers were so bad. I guess it's just like people who like to watch fires. Sightseers were blocking the road two or three cars across. Where they all came from, I don't know. I know when I went home at 4:30 in the morning I never saw so many cars on the road in my life."

The converging tornado spectators fit well the distinguishing features of a mass: the derivation of participants from all walks of life, anonymity of individuals involved, lack of interaction among participants, and the absence of organization and leadership.⁶

Turner and Killian refer to convergence behavior as "restructuring activity": "One form all too familiar to policemen, firemen, and ambulance drivers is 'going to see what happened.' The heedless rush of the curious to the center of a disaster area is a familiar feature of such situations. While some people may engage in the rush because of official duties or anxiety about relatives, many go simply out of curiosity."⁷ This is but one of several types of collective behavior which grew out of the disaster situation. What happened as the situation became organized and leadership was exerted?

Social Cohesion on the Periphery. Perhaps the most remarkable observation to be made regarding the restoration of order out of the chaos concerns the weakening of long-standing enmities. The tornado not only wiped out homes and schools and stores; it also obliterated the existing social organization. It created a vacuum—socially as well as physically. In any modern city there is recurrent conflict along the urban fringe over such issues as annexation, police and fire jurisdiction, and the like. Yet, within fifteen minutes, in response to urgent telephone and radio pleas from authorities in the stricken area, the Kansas City police moved in rapidly and efficiently, although the area lay completely outside the city limits. County and city law-enforcement officials have always had their differences, but they dissolved (temporarily, to be sure) in a matter of minutes after the tornado hit. As the police from smaller near-by communities rushed to help, the large urban police organization filled the gap in those small communities.⁸

Much more deep-rooted and institutionalized antipathies fell by the wayside. The most extreme example of such a truce is provided

⁶ Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," Part IV of *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, ed. by Alfred M. Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1946), pp. 185 ff. See also Richard T. LaPiere on "Revelous Behavior," in his *Collective Behavior* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1938), Ch. 18.

⁷ Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, *Collective Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1957), pp. 43-44.

⁸ A sheriff's deputy describes the situation as follows: "The Kansas City police department was answering all the calls in the Independence area and some in Raytown. In fact, they answered most of our calls [sheriff's] for us because our men were all out in that [tornado] area."

by a downtown Kansas City patrolman who had been assigned to help dig out in the disaster area. He has drawn this little vignette:

It was getting light—nearly morning—and we were just beginning to get some notion of how bad things really were. I was digging away and I looked up, and standing next to me with a pick in his hand was Jo-Jo Moreli, a small time errand boy in the rackets. I've chased him through every alley in Kansas City at one time or another. He's got a record a mile long. So I grab him by the collar and say, "What the hell you trying to do, Moreli, pick over the bones?" He says he isn't doing anything but helping and that the Boss sent him and a lot of the other boys to help dig out. So, believe it or not, there were me and Jo-Jo Moreli digging away side by side. He never stepped out of line that I could see, and believe me, I was watching.

This feeling of "we-ness" diffused out from its core in the center of destruction to include many people in the metropolitan area and, indeed, some who were well outside of it. Offers to help, donations of food, clothing, and money poured in. Most of the ubiquitous sightseers, who so obstructed the efforts of police and rescue workers on the first night, honestly thought of themselves as going to the aid of their fellow men. It was their earnest desire to help (some of these doubtless were seeking close friends and relatives who lived in the disaster area). For weeks following the tornado this vast metropolitan area basked in the warmth of a feeling of brotherhood.⁹

The extent to which a disaster can unite a stricken community has been documented elsewhere.¹⁰ But the forces of social cohesion resulting from a disaster situation appear to transcend the immediate stricken area and the victims. Recent history is replete with examples of a united world drawn together in its sympathy and relief efforts for a stricken nation.¹¹ Just as the manifest functions of such activ-

⁹ The *Kansas City Star* summarizes editorially (and somewhat romantically) the variety of persons who converged voluntarily either to help or to hinder the disaster relief: "Within minutes hundreds of men and women with special talents and equipment sensed the magnitude of this tragedy and their role in it. As if by instinct, they knew what to do. A doctor leaving a lecture . . . headed his motor car for Hickman Mills. A carnival operator dispatched his tractor-trailer carrying . . . arc lights to Ruskin Heights. . . . A former nurse put on a faded uniform and drove to Martin City. Multiply these instances 100 or perhaps 1,000 times and you get the picture of what happened spontaneously on Monday night."

¹⁰ See, for example, Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Tornado in Worcester*, Disaster Study No. 3 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1956).

¹¹ From the great Japanese earthquakes of 1923 to those in Chile in 1960, we have had evidence of the manner in which money, supplies, and personnel can pour across international barriers in a concentrated effort to cope with a disaster.

ities are to relieve the suffering and a latent function is to improve international relations, so too it is possible that in the Kansas City disaster the dissolution of traditional barriers as an emergency measure provided an atmosphere more conducive to co-operation on a local level. To the extent that the experience was part of the socialization of the people in the community (though much of it may well have been superficial), the disaster could have enduring effects on the relationships among individuals and institutions in the community. A clear-cut example of the permanent impact of disaster on political institutions is found in the evolution of the commission form of city government resulting directly from the Galveston flood of 1908. One might ask to what extent the cause of metropolitan area planning in Kansas City was furthered by the disaster experience.

It's Good to Be Needed. It appeared to the observers that many people obtained various kinds of satisfactions as a result of the tornado. The gratifications of the hard-working members of disaster relief agencies provide one of the clearest examples. Although such agencies include the police, National Guard, Civil Defense, and Salvation Army, the authors had a unique opportunity to observe the reaction of Red Cross professionals and volunteers.

On the morning following the disaster and for several days thereafter the Red Cross building was swarming with exhausted men and women whose bloodshot eyes told the story of countless hours without sleep. These people were radiant with the glory of being needed and being able to apply their skills at disaster relief—skills which in some cases had lain dormant during the six years since the great Kansas City floods.¹² They chatted incessantly with each other—in the hallways, on the elevators, in the dining room—comparing notes on how many hours each had been without sleep. These hours, along with the tired, lined faces, were worn like campaign ribbons, each additional hour giving status to its wearer. The office routines of the great bureaucracy which is an urban Red Cross chapter came grinding to a halt as the lowest file clerk labored, gathering sleepless hours along with the top administrators. The monotony of everyday business was broken. This hyperactivity along with the

¹² This description may not be accurate when applied to itinerant professionals who are constantly assigned to disaster service in various parts of the country. It may be that such professionals come to view disasters as accidents, as in the example of the highway patrolman and automobile accidents mentioned in note 3.

cheerful recounting of gruesome details continued unabated for nearly a week. Similar behavior could probably have been observed in any of the organizations which aided in disaster relief.

During the days immediately following the tornado, a carnival-like atmosphere pervaded the disaster scene. On the bare concrete slabs from which houses had been blown, signs appeared bearing such notices as "Don't bother to knock; just walk in," and "This house for sale, cash only." The parade of sightseers, the outdoor homeowners' meetings, the mobile canteens, children playing in the rubble (the school had been destroyed)—all were anomalously more reminiscent of an old-fashioned Fourth of July picnic than a disaster-stricken community. But even a picnic gets tiresome after a time. As one of the residents put it, "We are getting tired of talking about these things now and we are not seeking new thrills. We are sort of anxious to get back to normalcy." Somewhat anticlimactic was the final reward, the citations and awards distributed among the dozens of organizations which had participated in the disaster relief work.

Making the Most of a Bad Thing. It appeared to the observers that agencies and individuals alike discovered exploitative possibilities in the disaster. For the moment only noncommercial exploitation of either an economic or a political nature shall be considered. Had every agency raised all the money it had set for a goal or requested, there would have been an average of over \$60,000 available for each of the 418 families whose ten to twelve thousand dollar homes had been damaged or lost.¹³ The largest single amount requested was 25 million which the governor asked of the federal government for "rehabilitation of public works." Less than forty-eight hours after the tornado struck, the Red Cross had in operation an efficiently organized fund-raising campaign with the goal set at one million dollars. This money was to be used for "family relief." If it is estimated that approximately two hundred families were in need of immediate financial assistance, this amounts to \$5,000 per family (not nearly this much was actually raised). Early in the month following the disaster, when the Salvation Army closed out its field services, it announced that \$58,108 had been contributed for tornado relief. A carefully itemized accounting of how the money was spent reveals that expenditures amounted to "nearly \$50,000."

¹³ Much of this money was, of course, earmarked for the rebuilding of public institutions and utilities rather than for individual families. In addition, there is considerable overhead expense to the agencies in question.

This apparently left the Salvation Army with over \$8,000 to cover "overhead" as a result of the tornado. It is not suggested that relief services make a "profit" from disasters; rather, it is suggested that it is necessary for such agencies to use specific disasters to augment their general funds so that they may provide services in other sometimes less dramatic areas.

If, in addition, it is recognized that most of the damaged and destroyed homes were nearly new, had been purchased for nothing to \$200 down, and presumably were fully insured for the protection of the mortgage holders, what is the likelihood that much financial loss other than that resulting from the destruction of uninsured household goods was suffered by individual homeowners? A burst of applause greeted the following announcement by a resident at a home owners' meeting:

. . . my house was completely blown away. I just went and settled with my own insurance company. Now I want to tell you this. If your home is built for \$12,000 and it's been destroyed and you build another home for \$10,000, that \$2,000 goes into your pockets and not into the insurance company's or the contractor's. That's your money.

There is evidence which suggests that a disaster may also be used as a political springboard. The Salvation Army, for example, used the tornado as a rationale for permanently moving into rural areas;¹⁴ proponents of the National Guard seized the opportunity to slap at those who would abolish the Guard;¹⁵ and the national office of the Red Cross took advantage of national interest to remind the country that it is the function of the privately operated Red Cross rather than the government to provide disaster relief.¹⁶ It is probably no coincidence that the man who did most to help the disaster victims (himself a victim) and who represented them at several meetings, decided to run for political office a year after the tornado.

¹⁴ "Walter J. Creely, St. Louis, pointed out here yesterday that the need for extending Salvation Army services throughout the state was illustrated by recent tornado disasters."—*Kansas City Star*.

¹⁵ "Various ill-advised proposals in the past would merge the state-controlled National Guard with federal reserve forces. But if this were done, no authority would exist within the states for calling guardsmen into disaster service. Guard units perform an indispensable role, as the terrible week of the tornado has demonstrated."—*Kansas City Star* editorial.

¹⁶ "General Alfred M. Gruenther, president of the American Red Cross, today, lauded the efforts of his agency in family rehabilitation work and cautioned that it would be an error for the government ever to undertake such assistance."—Speech in Kansas City reported in the *Kansas City Star*.

Competition between relief groups ran high, and although it appeared publicly to be little more than friendly rivalry—an effort to see who could do the most for those in need—this was not the picture obtained by the interviewers. By week's end, the rosy glow of co-operation had begun to wear thin and expressions of resentment toward other groups were commonly made by representatives of particular agencies. A high ranking Salvation Army officer, when asked about the rumors which spread whenever the Red Cross is involved in disaster relief, that that agency was selling relief supplies, replied with a confidential wink, "where there's smoke, there's fire." A high ranking National Guard officer expressed—confidentially of course—contempt for the sheriff's office and pity for the disaster area residents who would be left under the protection of the sheriff when the Guard withdrew. The interviewers received the clear impression that respondents, whether clergymen, policemen, or relief agency representatives, bent a great deal of effort toward making themselves or their agencies look "good," usually at the expense of competing individuals or agencies.

Such competitive forces, like the cohesive forces discussed earlier, are part of the ongoing socialization of the individuals involved. It may be assumed that there is some surviving residue of these conflicts which affects later relationships between the individuals and institutions concerned. If it is reasonable to expect a degree both of permanent cohesion and permanent conflict as a result of the disaster experience, what then is the net result in a given community in terms of interpersonal and interinstitutional relationships?

Business is Good. The functionality of such a disaster from a commercial point of view is reflected in newspaper advertising during the weeks following. The newspapers were literally overflowing with special advertisements. It is difficult to convey the quality of this advertising. One enterprising insurance agency presented a picture of a vicious tornado, frustrated in its attempted attack on a man who was fortunately protected by an impenetrable umbrella in the form of his insurance policy. The caption read: "You can't temper the wind, but you can temper the loss with complete insurance coverage by Thomas McGee and Sons."¹⁷

¹⁷ Typical of many ads is the following: "Big news for tornado disaster victims. Trade your damaged or destroyed home for a new furnished home built well by Elbel Homes in Vineyard Village . . . These homes all have *full basements*. . . . Elbel Con-

Advertisements ranging up to a full page in size announced a multitude of economic inducements to tornado victims. They were not only for new homes, appliances, loans, insurance, and furniture—all appeals to victims—but also a variety of commercial appeals to the fresh market supplied by a tornado-wary metropolitan population. Manufacturers of prefabricated “tornado” shelters (originally bomb shelters) warned that every responsible homeowner owed it to his family to buy one. Advertisements for such shelters appealed to both dealers and customers. The largest number of advertisements resulting from the tornado pushed a variety of “necessary” furnishings for a tornado-proof basement or shelter: transistor radios, Coleman lamps, tinned water supplies, and a plethora of miscellaneous camping equipment.

Family Reunions. The effect of disaster on families which have been stricken—the re-enforcement of family ties and the feeling of a new cohesiveness—has been documented elsewhere.¹⁸ But a factor which impressed the authors was the impact of syndicated and network newscasting. In addition to the usual news outlets, the tornado was featured in a live remote telecast on the Dave Garroway show the next morning. It was then that the long distance switchboards in Kansas City began lighting up in earnest. That evening a local telecaster announced, “We have been literally flooded with telephone calls from all over the nation. . . . Everyone in the nation, it seems, is looking toward Kansas City tonight to find out what has happened so we are on the hearts and the minds of most of the nation here tonight.” The day following the tornado the words “Hello, Ma?” rang from one end of the country to the other out of Kansas City. There was now a good rationale for long-range family reunions and they took place in great numbers.¹⁹ Telephone company

struction Co. staff has been working night and day cutting red tape to bring you this offer. . . . You can move in today.”—Ad in the *Kansas City Times*.

¹⁸ Fritz, “Therapeutic Features of Disaster and Their Effects on Family Adjustment: Some Research Orientations.”

¹⁹ In these days of high rates of geographic mobility, children as often as not leave the parental home to find work wherever it is available. Parents are visited or visit perhaps on annual vacations, but seldom more frequently. These scattered families rely largely on the post office and the telephone company to maintain communication. It is the writers’ impression that, in spite of phone company advertising to the contrary, middle class Americans are not prone to use long distance phone calls except where there is a specific reason to do so. We do not believe that many Kansas City young couples place frequent calls to New York or Los Angeles just to say hello to the folks.

records indicate that the calls peaked during the two days following the tornado and then returned to normal.²⁰

Everything's Free. The carnival-like atmosphere mentioned earlier, coupled with the general state of confusion, the hoards of sightseers, the concentration of police in the area of total destruction, and the several hundred partially damaged houses standing open and unoccupied on the fringe of the area, led inevitably to the free flow of rumors and accusations of looting. Some disaster analysts have suggested that looting is practically nonexistent in a disaster situation, implying that the rumors are by and large without basis: "The actual incidence of looting and other forms of exploitation found in peacetime disasters . . . is relatively insignificant . . ."²¹

Data on the Kansas City tornado indicate that this may be an understatement of the case. There are a few reliable eyewitness accounts of pilfering and looting, by both youngsters and adults, by persons who lived in the area and by outsiders. Granted that the widespread stories of persons carrying off cash registers from stores moments after they had been hit and picking over dead bodies could not be substantiated and were in all probability pure figments of somebody's imagination, there is, nevertheless, some evidence of extensive looting behavior of various types immediately following the disaster, evidence coming from persons in strategic positions, e.g., a Catholic priest ministering on the scene²² and the sheriff's radio dispatcher.²³ A police lieutenant reports "a tremendous" amount of looting the first night and his own frustration at the darkness, poor communication, inability to get into certain areas, and lack of enough men to patrol because of their preoccupation with rescue work. A National Guard officer matter-of-factly points out that this was the

²⁰ On the day following the tornado the telephone company recorded 62,219 outgoing long distance calls. The normal figure for that date is 32,549. Incoming calls (long distance) on that day numbered 58,097; the normal figure is 26,668.

²¹ Fritz and Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²² The Catholic priest informed the interviewer that "I saw it [looting] personally . . . Every store was open; everything was blown away. It was tragic . . . seeing them looting while you were down on your hands and knees. We came out around 12 o'clock. I had three marine reservists with me and we crawled in the rubble. They shot in the air a few times, but their purpose was for discipline and discipline was sorely needed at that time."

²³ The sheriff's radio dispatcher reports: "The first night we didn't notice too much because there were so many other things going on, but the next day and the following day it was terrible. It was like stealing pennies off of a dead man's eyes. There was valuable stuff laying out in the yards and they'd jump out and get it and throw it in their car. The next day and the following we must have had ten or fifteen arrests."

only reason his organization was called out. A policeman recounts how he apprehended two men loading a truck with new tires from a filling station which had not even been damaged. And from residents of the area, there are reports tinged with both resentment²⁴ and disillusionment.²⁵

There were many statements by police, guardsmen, and deputy coroners to the effect that they had chased looters out of stores and homes. Because these people were occupied with more important duties, there were few actual arrests—only five reported by the press, and of these, one was released immediately and only two were held on felony charges. The fact that there was little time to do more than chase looters away may in part explain the sheriff's denial of looting reports. He claimed to have received but a single report of looting and that came from a construction company which suspected that its building materials in the area were being pilfered. Those who would minimize the extent of looting behavior in a disaster should remember that under such conditions it is expedient simply to chase looters away and that this results in a lack of official reports and arrests. It is also true that under cover of darkness and confusion a great deal of looting may go unnoticed with the resulting loss being attributed to the disaster itself. On the other hand, it is possible that much "looting" is little more than figments of the imaginations of those reporting it. The phenomenon of looting remains an open question on which there are few reliable data.

An Interpretation of the Collective Behavior

The study of human behavior under situations where the existing social organization either collapses or does not apply—that

²⁴ "... during the evening I ran into several people who were in my house. They would enter through the back door and I would have to chase them out. Now some of them came in with the assumption or gave you the idea that they were looking to see if anyone was injured, but as a rule a man doesn't have to go around with a two foot stick, scraping around in six inches of debris, looking for bodies, you see, that doesn't hardly work out. . . . I sat here with a shotgun that evening."

²⁵ A woman whose infant daughter had died en route to the hospital and whose home had been completely blown away informed the interviewer that "one thing that seemed bad, was people from Ruskin were out doing some looting and everybody felt bad about that. Our neighbor was out there and a couple went out in his back yard and picked up his piggy bank and he called to them. They only lived a couple of blocks from us; their house wasn't hurt and I thought that was kinda hitting below the belt. I can imagine someone else coming in and looting, but to live right there and do it!"

is, the study of collective behavior—has suffered from a lack of reliable empirical data. What theory exists has been based in large part on historical and journalistic accounts. It has been the exception when a trained sociological observer has been present during such a situation. Lee and Humphrey's *Race Riot* is one such fortunate exception.²⁰ In recent years, however, certain groups, most notably the Disaster Research Group of the National Academy of Sciences, have been engaged in the systematic observation and collection of data on a variety of disaster situations. These situations and the data derived from them provide an excellent opportunity for the further development of a theory of collective behavior. By and large that opportunity has not been exploited. The present paper, largely descriptive in nature, is intended to suggest the ways in which a disaster may be viewed functionally from a collective behavior perspective.

In a disaster such as the one described, behavior can be viewed from the vantage point of at least three different groups: (1) members of agencies which are involved with the consequences of a disaster—not only such organizations as the Red Cross or Salvation Army but such others as the National Guard, church organizations, public utility companies, and law enforcing agencies; (2) victims of the disaster; and (3) the peripheral groups—sightseers, thieves, on-lookers, and helpers.

Each of these groups perceives the effects of a disaster differently, and each performs functions which may appear dysfunctional from the perspective of others. For instance, telephone calls may be very important to victims who feel a need to re-establish contact with their families, but an overloading of existing circuits may be interpreted by telephone company workers as an additional burden on already disrupted facilities. On the other hand, members of competing agencies who might have thought of each other as "enemies" will temporarily discard their enmities in favor of performing functions conceived as necessary to aid a stricken community (manifest function) to the actual benefit of both competing agencies (latent functions).

²⁰ Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, *Race Riot* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943). More recently, several carefully documented studies of disasters have been published. See, for example, Hilda Grieve, *The Great Tide: The Story of the 1953 Flood Disaster in Essex* (County Hall, Chelmsford: County Council of Essex, 1959); Harry E. Moore, *Tornadoes Over Texas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958).

While disasters and their consequences are usually analyzed by social scientists from the perspective of the victims, it is also necessary to recognize that those victims are interacting with vast groups of individuals, agencies, and other collectivities whose actions may influence the behavior of the victims during the period of emergency. Although the goal of each of these groups is the eventual recovery of the disaster area, in the process of carrying out their various functions, the grim tasks take on aspects of "fun" for some individuals and "profit" for others.

It has frequently been noted that outbreaks of collective behavior are likely to occur in the spring of the year, whether they derive from the festivals of European peasants, dissatisfaction with prison conditions, or the quest for coeds' panties. However, participation in such types of behavior is restricted to limited populations; one must be a European peasant, a prison inmate, or a college boy.²⁷ It is also true that participation in such activities is often socially disapproved, so that one may feel impelled to anticipate the possibility of punitive consequences. In a disaster—and the one regularity which can be fairly well counted on in the case of the Midwestern tornado is its occurrence on a *spring* afternoon or evening²⁸—nature provides an opportunity not only for anyone to participate but to do so with honor. To "help" in a disaster is not only fun; it is often heroic. Is it unreasonable to assume that for workers in agencies such as the Red Cross or Civil Defense the rare opportunity to attain fulfillment—to bring into play years of unapplied training and preparation—provides a satisfying experience?

Some of the latent functions or consequences described in the preceding section are obviously dysfunctional from the vantage point of the values of the larger community (e.g., looting). But most have important functions for strengthening the community as a whole and its agencies and even individual family and neighborhood ties. And there are, of course, those which are functional to one segment of the community and dysfunctional to others (e.g., sightseeing).

Such a situation provides a legitimate and valued opportunity to

²⁷ It is probably true that certain conveniently located bystanders can manage to get into the act. No doubt some city folk enjoy the peasant reveling and town loafers participate with the college boys in panty raids.

²⁸ According to the Kansas City weather bureau the tornado season in the Gulf states occurs in late winter. It would be interesting to test the hypothesis that seasonal difference affects the behavior of the populace in response to the disaster.

engage in a frenzy of orgiastic behavior—to exhaust oneself by frantic day and night activity without food, drink, or sleep, and finally it provides a respite from the humdrum routine of daily existence—from the job, from family responsibilities, from dullness, from boredom. It provides a unique opportunity for the self-defined “soft” urban male to again be a man among men—at least for a few hours.

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Determinants of Occupational Community in High Status Occupations*

JOEL E. GERSTL

A FREQUENT FOCUS of both contemporary social criticism and sociological analysis is upon the subtle interplay between work and leisure. One of the pervading themes in these polemics stems from a consideration of the differential changes in the length of the work week for various occupational strata and the consequent projection to a future which will involve more leisure for the masses and more work—or at least a continuation of strenuous work—for the upper classes.¹

The very different meaning of work for the two strata is a most crucial consideration in delineating the opposite trends of the masses and the classes. As recent studies have indicated, while work offers few positive satisfactions and is not a central life interest for the majority of industrial workers, it has more positive extra-economic functions for the individual at the higher levels of occupation and skill.² However, when the analysis turns to the upper end of the

* Slightly revised version of a paper read at the meetings of the Midwest Sociological Society, St. Louis, April, 1960. The author is indebted to Theodore Caplow for his suggestions.

¹ See Robert Bendiner, "Could You Stand a Four-day Week?" *The Reporter*, 17:10-14 (Aug. 8, 1957); David Riesman, "Leisure and Work in Post-Industrial Society," in *Mass Leisure*, ed. by Eric Larrabee and Rolf Meyersohn (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), pp. 363-85; and Harold L. Wilensky, "Work Roles, Careers, and Social Integration: Notes on the Relation of Industrial Sociology to General Sociology," paper read in part at the American Sociological Association meetings, Chicago, September, 1959.

² Of direct relevance is Robert Dubin's study of the central life interests of workers, "Industrial Workers' Worlds," *Social Problems*, 2:131-42 (Jan., 1956). Louis H. Orzack's "Work as a 'Central Life Interest' of Professionals," *Social Problems*, 7:125-32 (Fall, 1959), is a useful replication of Dubin's work, although

occupational hierarchy, generalization becomes somewhat precarious. Of course there are important contrasts in the setting of work for the industrial laborer, but great uniformities do persist. The holding of an occupation with high status, on the other hand, does not tell us very much by itself, and it dictates a detailed consideration of contrasts.

This paper is concerned with such a contrast of three "upper-middle class" occupational settings: the independent professional practitioner (dentist), the organization man of the corporate world (adman), and the salaried intellectual (college professor). While the original study explored the general problem of the relationship of work to leisure and of career commitment to life style,³ this report is limited to an examination of one aspect of the work-leisure polarity—the occupational community,⁴ reflecting the pervasiveness of occupational identification in the convergence of informal friendship patterns and colleague relationships. The three occupational settings are contrasted in examining the interplay of factors conducive to role convergence and bifurcation. *If* there is a relationship between occupational milieu and the existence of an extensive occupational community and *if* certain occupations can be differen-

the title is misleading since the data concern nurses, who are obviously different from industrial workers, but also obviously different from all other professionals, mainly by virtue of the nurse's sex. Nancy C. Morse and Robert S. Weiss, in "The Function and Meaning of Work and the Job," *American Sociological Review*, 20:191-98 (Apr., 1955), show the differences in the meaning of work at varying occupational levels, the middle class being motivated by intrinsic interest and the working class merely by the desire to keep occupied. Eugene A. Friedman and Robert J. Havighurst, in *The Meaning of Work and Retirement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), reveal that there is least yearning for retirement, suggesting extra-economic meanings of work, among members of higher status occupations.

³ Joel E. Gerstl, "Career Commitment and Style of Life in Three Middle Class Occupations" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1959).

⁴ The present usage of the concept of occupational community as the convergence of informal friendship patterns and colleague relationships follows that of Seymour Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman in *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956). This usage is consistent with the notion of community, "not as a term for an area where people live but for a kind of integrated system of social life in which geographical area is secondary or irrelevant."—Don Martindale, *American Social Structure* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), p. 133. A specialized use of the concept of community is that of William J. Goode, "Community within a Community: The Professions," *American Sociological Review*, 22:194-200 (Apr., 1957). The members of this professional community, although bound by a sense of identity, etc., need not interact with each other. An alternative concept, which emphasizes interaction but is not concerned with bonds of identity is 'ambience.'—Theodore Caplow, "The Definition and Measurement of Ambiences," *Social Forces*, 34:28-33 (Oct., 1955).

tiated with respect to occupational milieu, then significant differences in occupational community should be found when the said occupations are appropriately compared.

The study is based upon seventy-five interviews, one-third in each of the occupational groups, all conducted by the writer. The dentists and admen were from a large midwestern city; the college professors were on the faculty of a small residential college, which will be referred to as Sauk College, located some distance from an urban center. As a result of predetermined controls, all respondents were in the same age bracket, around the age of forty.⁵

A primary determinant of occupational community is that of sheer opportunity. The small-town situation of the Sauk professors is unique in this respect. But although the geographical factor is undoubtedly important in explaining the overlap of friendships and of work with other activities and although it precludes certain contrasts with the other two groups from a metropolitan setting—at the same time that it highlights some extremes, it must not be exaggerated to the exclusion of occupational determinants.⁶

In one major respect the working situation of the admen is more conducive to colleague friendship than is the dentists'. The admen work together with other admen and frequently lunch together as well. Almost all of the dentists, on the other hand, work alone and the majority do not meet with colleagues for lunch. There is, however, one factor which affords more of a chance for colleague friendships among the dentists. All had attended the same professional school, where the formation of a peer group culture during the intensive training period would be inevitable. Undoubtedly, a sizable

⁵ For a detailed discussion of sample selection and sample characteristics see Joel E. Gerstl, *op. cit.*, pp. 27–50. The major point to be made is that the occupational groups utilized were not considered as random samples but rather as categories of respondents who had two things in common—age and occupational position. Essentially, the technique was that of a case study, the cases being those of a small college and two occupational milieus in a large city. This is not to say that the findings are limited to the groups studied, but particularistic characteristics, including especially that of geographical location, must be recognized.

⁶ Indeed, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., in *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 31, found that 62 per cent of their respondents confined their main social contacts to the university. Interestingly, among schools of the same size, as the quality of the college increases, so does the amount of colleague-centered social life. For a relevant contrast of cosmopolitan and local professors, see Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 2:281–306 (Dec., 1957) and 444–80 (Mar., 1958).

proportion of these school associates remained in the city to practice.

The participation in formal occupational associations does in itself represent occupational involvement. And at the same time, it constitutes a determinant of occupational community in the chance provided for interaction with colleagues. A measure combining number of organizations and activity in organizations belonged to reveals 60 per cent of the admen, 72 per cent of the dentists, and 32 per cent of the professors to be "high participators." Even the minority of dentists who are classified as low participators, in terms of their occupational norm, attend more meetings than do some of the highly involved participators in academic and advertising work. In addition, almost half of the dentists had taken part in some study courses in the year preceding the interview. Thus, although the dentist works alone, he has ample opportunity to associate with his colleagues. And he does, in fact, associate with them in the context of various professional activities.

Working deviant hours is an obvious limitation on occupational community in such extreme cases as represented by night work.⁷ But even minor divergence from the typical eight to five, Monday to Friday routine, as exists in the three groups under study must be noted. The professors are constantly immersed in their work and in networks of colleague interaction. The modal pattern is to work some 56 to 60 hours a week. Although the professors' work permeates a major portion of their evenings and weekends, there is considerable time off in the course of the day for things apart from academic tasks, including informal interaction with colleagues. While the admen's working schedule is considerably shorter, averaging 45 hours a week, it is similar to the professors' in being flexible. (Like the professors, the admen could take time off in the middle of a working day to be interviewed.) Their schedule necessitates close working interaction with their colleagues, in the office as well as outside. They may lunch together, travel together, or take part in long night sessions, attempting to meet the ever-present crisis or deadline of their trade. The dentists' 40 hours of weekly labor, as has been noted, are spent apart from colleagues. But, days or half-days off during the week are typical. Accordingly, the potential for colleague friendship exists in the context of leisure as well

⁷ See Lipset *et al.*, *op cit.*, pp. 135-39; and Theodore Caplow, *The Sociology of Work* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1954), pp. 95-98.

as in the context of activity in professional associations, in which the dentists excel.

Another determinant of occupational community, as suggested by Lipset, Trow, and Coleman's study of printers,⁸ is the extent to which one's occupation is felt to be prestigious. Although all three of the groups under study have a relatively high societal status, the relevant question is the incumbent's perception of his occupation's standing. Respondents were asked to rank a list of eleven occupations, one of which was their own, on the basis of the "respect" felt

TABLE 1. OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE RATINGS OF THE THREE OCCUPATIONS BY INCUMBENTS AND BY OTHERS

		<i>Admen</i> Ranked by <i>Selves Others</i>		<i>Dentists</i> Ranked by <i>Selves Others</i>		<i>Professors</i> Ranked by <i>Selves Others</i>	
Rank							
High	(1-3)	24%	2%	68%	0	92%	40%
Middle	(4-8)	56%	0	32%	46%	8%	54%
Low	(9-11)	20%	98%	0	54%	0	6%
Total		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
No. of raters		(25)	(50)	(25)	(50)	(25)	(50)
Chi square		50.8		48.9		18.6	
With 2 d.f. $p <$.001		.001		.001	

toward each. The list included high status occupations covering a broad range of interests and values to guard against the tendency of invoking personal tastes and abilities. In addition to the adman, dentist, and professor, the list contained physician, business executive, lawyer, scientist, architect, journalist, minister-priest-rabbi, and foreign service diplomat.

The common phenomenon of overestimating the status of one's occupation⁹ is manifest in each of the three groups. This may be clearly seen in Table 1. Dentists and professors agreed in placing the admen at the bottom of the ratings, the professors being more nearly unanimous in reserving the bottom rung for them. (Indeed,

⁸ Lipset *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 106-26.

⁹ See Salomon Retting, Frank N. Jacobson, and Benjamin Pasmanick, "Status Overestimation, Objective Status, and Job Satisfaction Among Professions," *American Sociological Review*, 23:75-81 (Feb., 1958); Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, "Jobs and Occupations, A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, 9:3-18 (Sept., 1947); and Theodore Caplow, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

the majority of the professors were not satisfied to leave the admen at the bottom of the heap but proceeded to trample them even lower with invectives.) While the professors' vituperative statements are probably not representative of the feelings of the general public, admen certainly are not generally held in high regard. Apart from the not irrelevant moral feelings toward the field of advertising, the adman would be lower than any of the other ten occupations on the list if intercalated into the North-Hatt scale.¹⁰ Thus, the judgments of the dentists and professors are not at all anomalous. Similarly, the admen indicate an awareness of their calling's social status in that their self-rating was lower than the self-rating of other groups, self-aggrandizement notwithstanding.

At the other extreme, the high self-ratings which the professors accord themselves correspond to the high prestige which the profession has in society. Although professors feel unloved, the cruel world outside the ivory tower does accord them high status, as the North-Hatt findings show. But the Sauk professors overestimate even more. By the North-Hatt criteria, professors are below physicians and foreign service diplomats. Yet, two-thirds of the Sauk faculty assign themselves the highest rank. Their seemingly paranoid self-ratings appear more reasonable if it is recognized that the professors' point of reference is that of the small community in which Sauk is located.¹¹

There were some differences in the ratings which admen and dentists assigned the professors. The dentists tended to give the academician a middle rating, with four the modal point. The admen thought more highly of the professors. But there were also some

¹⁰ Cecil C. North and Paul K. Hatt, *op. cit.*

¹¹ Unfortunately, it is not possible to say how representative the occupational paranoia of the Sauk professors is in comparison with the academic profession as a whole. However, it should be noted that the research of Lazarsfeld and Thielens finds that professors do not see themselves as a group with great prestige. Their respondents were asked how typical businessmen, Congressmen, or college trustees would rank professors in contrast to the manager of a branch bank, an account executive of an advertising agency, and a lawyer. The majority of those answering thought that businessmen and Congressmen would put them in the last place; only one-fifth thought they would rank first with the trustees.—Lazarsfeld and Thielens, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–14. They conclude that, "professors, at least social scientists, seem to consider themselves an occupational minority toward which significant sectors of the community hold contemptuous attitudes."—*Ibid.*, p. 14. Interestingly, they also found that "the higher the professional status of a professor . . . the more strongly he feels that his prestige is low in the outside world."—*Ibid.*, p. 148. Cf. Seymour M. Lipset, "American Intellectuals: Their Politics and Status," *Daedalus*, 88:460–86 (Summer, 1959).

admen who placed the professors in the low category; none of the dentists did.

According to comparable levels on the North-Hatt scale, the dentists should receive a middle rating, a score of seven. All but one of the dentists exceeded this in their self-ratings. Admen were more prone to place the dentists in the lowest position than were the professors. This is largely due to the professors' reserving the bottom of their lists for the admen.

In terms of occupational self-analysis, the professors are the most likely to recognize the high prestige of their work. Conversely, the

TABLE 2. COMMITMENT BY OCCUPATION

<i>Commitment</i>	<i>Admen</i>	<i>Dentists</i>	<i>Professors</i>
Very Low	4%	24%	0
Low	8%	16%	16%
Moderate	40%	44%	36%
High	48%	16%	48%
Total	100%	100%	100%
No of cases	(25)	(25)	(25)

Dichotomizing moderate and high *vs.* low commitment:

Admen-Dentists: Chi square = 5.09 $p < .05$

Dentists-Professors: Chi square = 3.67 $p < .06$

admen most readily acknowledge their status to be middle, at best. The dentists stand halfway between these extremes. In all three groups there is exaggeration of occupational status but with different degrees of justification. The dentists manifest the major disparity from the image held by outsiders. As the diagonal zeros in Table 1 indicate, while none of the dentists place themselves in the category of low prestige, none of the outsiders deign to award them high prestige.

The remaining determinant of occupational community is that of occupational commitment—the extent of dedication to and involvement in one's work.¹² The principal measure of commitment in this

¹² See Howard S. Becker, "Notes on the Concept of Commitment," *American Journal of Sociology*, 66:32-40 (July, 1960). Cf. Raymond W. Mack, "Occupational Ideology and the Determinate Role," *Social Forces*, 36:37-44 (Oct. 1957). In this study of salesmen, engineers, and bankers, Mack explains the contrasting orientations of work as means and work as an end in itself by the indeterminate or determinate nature of the respective occupational roles. In contrasting my findings with those of Mack (including responses to identical questions) I am struck by the divergence of the

study derives from open-end responses of career orientation stemming from the question, "Might you choose a different career if you had it to do over again?" Statements of commitment were rated upon a four point scale, from the individual who finds few satisfactions in his work and who would certainly choose a different career if he were to start over, to the individual who cannot conceive of himself doing anything else and expresses great enthusiasm for his work. A dichotomization into high and low commitment shows that while only 12 per cent of the admen and 16 per cent of the professors have a low commitment rating, 40 per cent of the dentists do; the dentists are significantly less committed than either of the other two groups. The modalities for each are equally revealing; they

TABLE 3. THE DETERMINANTS OF OCCUPATIONAL
COMMUNITY FOR THE THREE OCCUPATIONS

<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Admen</i>	<i>Dentists</i>	<i>Professors</i>
Opportunity for on-job interaction	High	Low	High
Participation in occupational associations	Medium	High	Low
Opportunity for off-job interaction (deviant hours)	Medium	Medium	High
Felt occupational prestige	Low	High	High
Work commitment	High	Low	High

consist of the highest category of commitment for the admen and professors, but only moderate commitment for the dentists.

Responses in each of the occupations reflected distinct ideologies. The admen, accustomed to articulation and to selling their products, spoke enthusiastically of their work. Almost to a man, they reiterated the themes of "creativity" and "challenge" as the core of their world of work. The Sauk professors spoke of their work in terms of its immediate setting. Their emphasis was upon the task of teaching and the stimulation from contacts with good students. References to a more general appeal of the academic climate were also oriented to Sauk, rather than to particular disciplines. The dentists made less mention of the task of dentistry, of workmanship, than they did of work setting. Their professional ideology, frequently contradicted in

dentists from the determinate model. The dentists, although determinate by Mack's criteria, appear most similar to his indeterminate salesmen. This discrepancy would seem to suggest the necessity of similar research upon additional occupational groups.

other parts of the interview, emphasized "dealing with people" and "independence."¹³

To predict the existence of an extensive occupational community as evidenced by a high degree of colleague friendship for the professors of Sauk College does not, of course, necessitate very much sagacity. They are high on all but one of the determinants recapitulated in Table 3. Their low rating on the extent of participation in occupational associations is certainly counterbalanced by living in a small college town in which they are a self-defined elite having little to do with the natives. Thus, both professional relationships and informal friendship ties are, of necessity, with fellow faculty members.

Consideration of the admen and dentists poses more difficulty. Work hours allow extensive work-connected interaction for the admen and offer the potential of leisure time interaction for the dentists. Differences in the extent of participation in occupational associations are not great, but the dentists are somewhat more involved in such groups. Although the feeling that one's occupation has low prestige would in most cases be a condition negative to the formation of an occupational community, this is not the case among the admen. Because they are strongly aware of their occupation's nasty public image, their feelings approximate those of a minority group—united because everyone is against them.¹⁴ As one of the admen put it,

[The grey-flannel Madison Avenue image of advertising] is not true! I would like to stand on soap boxes and make speeches on the subject. There is about as much truth to this as there is to the idea of universities being full of communists. . . . We are a damned hard-working bunch of people who just happen to be the butts of this decade, who knows who will be next. . . .

¹³ Edwin A. Christ, in his discussion of this paper at the meeting of the Midwest Sociological Society, has suggested that the occupational ideologies, "may only be a 'front' that is maintained as decorative window-dressing to the passersby—which includes the objectively inquiring sociologist!" I would not dismiss this possibility, but I suspect that respondents are quite willing to allow the interviewer, as a "stranger," to get a good glimpse of "the faces beyond the masks." In any event, the contrasts in rhetoric are relevant.

¹⁴ For a discussion of societal attack as a positive occupational bond, see Edward Gross, *Work and Society* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1958), pp. 227–29. Cf. Melvin Seeman, "The Intellectual and the Language of Minorities," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64:25–35 (July, 1958).

They feel bonds of identity in their striving for more favorable evaluation, in their attempt at professionalization. Status inducements for colleague friendship exist for both admen and dentists, albeit they are positive in one case and negative in the other.

A major contrast between the two occupations exists in the extent of on-job interaction. In counterbalance to this, however, it will be recalled that the dentists had the potentiality for friendship formation in professional school, with their peers remaining in the same geographical community.

The remaining variable, that of commitment, is probably the most essential one. It subsumes the complex syndrome of man's relation to his work. *Holding other factors constant, highly committed groups would be more likely to develop occupational communities*

TABLE 4. INCLUSION OF COLLEAGUES AMONG
TEN BEST FRIENDS BY OCCUPATION

<i>Proportion of Colleagues*</i>	<i>Admen</i>	<i>Dentists</i>	<i>Professors</i>
Low	36%	80%	12%
High	64%	20%	88%
Total	100%	100%	100%
No. of Cases	(25)	(25)	(25)

* Proportion dichotomized at one-fourth or less *vs.* more than one-fourth:

Admen-Dentists: Chi square = 9.9 $p < .002$

Dentists-Professors: Chi square = 23.3 $p < .001$

Admen-Professors: Chi square = 15.1 $p < .001$

than would those with low commitment. The man who finds his work to be merely a means of making money would be less likely to seek out his colleagues in his leisure time than would the man who finds his work to be a constant source of stimulation. In light of the balancing out of other factors in the comparison of admen and dentists and the lower degree of commitment among dentists, the extent of overlap of colleagues into the realm of social life should be lower for the dentists than it is for admen. This expectation is borne out by the data, as Table 4 indicates.

Of course, the most pervasive occupational community is that of the professors. And while two-thirds of the admen have a high proportion of colleagues among their ten best friends, only one-fifth of the dentists do. Differences between each of the occupational groups are statistically significant. Similar results ensue when the three best

friends are considered: 84 per cent of the professors, 48 per cent of the admen, and only 16 per cent of the dentists have at least two of their three best friends as occupational colleagues.

When all three occupations are combined for analysis, the relationship of commitment and occupational community is found to be statistically significant. But this does not especially clarify the unique situation of the dentists. Since so few have a high proportion of colleague-friends, alternative classification is required. The effect of commitment is seen clearly if the dentists who have no colleagues among their best friends are compared with those who have at least one. Two-thirds of the dentists with high commitment number at least one colleague among their best friends; conversely, 70 per cent of those with low commitment have no colleagues among their best friends. The relationship is even stronger if commitment is also more evenly dichotomized, with four-fifths of the highly committed dentists having a colleague among their friends and three-fourths of the lowly committed having none.

Apparently many of the friendships made in dental school have not continued, the Wednesday or Thursday afternoon off is spent with other dentists in only a few instances, and the professional contacts made at dental society meetings do not extend into the social life of many. This is not necessarily to say that a weak occupational community and the relatively low degree of commitment reveal dentists to be alienated from their work. But the separation of work from the rest of their lives is indicated. They are committed to their work, for the most part, only to the extent that it is the way in which they make their living. Of course it is an important part of their lives, merely in that it fills some 40 hours of each week. And, in addition, it also involves considerable activity in professional associations. But, just as it is not the type of work that would make for good conversation at parties, so there is no seeking out of other practitioners as leisure-time associates. Undoubtedly the necessary professional interchange is realized in the semiformal context of professional associations. The content of their work does not necessitate further spill-over, nor is their commitment great enough to warrant articulation of their professional life beyond the required minimum.

The admen represent a middle position. They share many common interests with colleagues. Their work involves a considerable amount

of mixing business with pleasure. They are highly committed to their careers and maintain feelings of solidarity with their colleagues in being in a field of questionable status. On the negative side, it should be added that, as is the case with the dentists, being in direct competition with each other would tend to inhibit informal colleague interaction. But the majority are members of large firms where competition with colleagues is indirect or absent.

For many of the professors of Sauk College, the separation of work from the rest of their lives is virtually impossible, even if it is thought desirable. Their work *is* their life; their vocation is their avocation. The extremity of role convergence is evidenced in their work orientation as well as in their social life. Their occupational community and geographical community are one.

Each of the occupations examined has particularistic features at the same time that each appears to represent a distinctive position on the continuum of role convergence. The marked contrasts among admen, dentists, and professors in the extent and character of work commitment and in the development of occupational communities indicate some of the subtleties operative in the work world of high status occupations and in the relationship of work to other spheres of social life.

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Rural-Urban Differences and the Family

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A CONSIDERABLE BODY of theory has arisen dealing with rural-urban differences in the family. The assertion in many cases, and the inference in others, is that the extended family is most important in rural areas and that the nuclear or conjugal family stands as a relatively independent unit in urban localities. Davis, Loomis, and Beegle, and Burgess and Locke are but a few of those who have held that the disintegration of the extended family has proceeded farther in the city than in the country.¹ These and other students of the family² in their comparisons of rural and urban life also suggest that people are so individualized in the city that they have little or no time to spend with members of their immediate families, and that in urban settings as contrasted with the rural settings there are few if any intrafamilial co-operative activities.

This particular hypothesis of the disintegration of the family in urban areas is but one of a number of related hypotheses which collectively and in their simplest form hold that urban areas are strongholds of secondary groups and inimical to primary groups.

Wirth and Redfield have advanced similar arguments that an increase in population size, heterogeneity, and density produces a decline in the importance of primary groups.³ Yet in recent years there

¹Kingsley Davis, *Human Society* (New York: Macmillan, 1949), pp. 422-27; Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, *Rural Social Systems* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 87-88; Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey J. Locke, *The Family* (New York: American Book Co., 1945), Chs. 3 and 4.

²Don Martindale and Elio D. Monachesi, *Elements of Sociology* (New York: Harpers, 1951), pp. 415-16; James H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development* (New York: Harpers, 1948), pp. 56-57; Robert E. L. Faris, *Social Disorganization* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948); Meyer Nimkoff, *Marriage and the Family* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1947), pp. 143-45, for a few representative selections.

³Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, 44:1-24 (July, 1938); Robert Redfield, "The Folk Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, 52:293-308 (Jan., 1947).

has been an increasing body of theory suggesting the opposite of the above hypothesis, e.g., that the family in urban areas has gained in importance in providing companionship, affection, and other primary group relationships for its members.⁴ Few direct comparisons have been made between samples of rural and urban dwellers to test the validity of such hypotheses. Most of the evidence adduced has been from secondary sources relying on historical works, census data, or on the evidence derived from studying individual communities at one period in time.⁵ The lack of direct comparison in a range of communities is a gap in our evidence. One of the major difficulties preventing direct testing of this hypothesis has been a methodological one. We lack valid scales to directly compare the interaction patterns of rural and urban dwellers. It is the purpose of this paper to report work on a scale of social participation by which such comparisons can be made. We chose the concept social participation since all or most of the aforementioned hypotheses suggest that individual members of the family (or any primary group) participate in family (or any primary group) activities less in the urban areas than in rural areas, and that there is a comparatively consistent decline in such participation as one goes from rural to urban. The pioneer work in this area has been performed by Queen and by Bernard and well began with the scales they had developed.⁶ *A priori*, we divided participation into functional areas and developed a scale for each area.⁷ We further developed the scale through preliminary interviews conducted in St. Louis and St. Louis County and later pre-tested the revised schedule in Fayetteville, Arkansas. After making minor modifications, the research was conducted as described below.

We delineated six areas for which scales were developed—neighboring, informal groups, formal groups, work, immediate family and the extended family. Questions were chosen initially from the works

⁴For two examples of this viewpoint see Svend Riemer, *The Modern City* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 258; and Stuart Queen and David Carpenter, *The American City* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), p. 265.

⁵Morris Axelrod, "Urban Structure and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review*, 21:13-19 (Feb., 1956).

⁶Stuart A. Queen, "Social Participation in Relation to Social Disorganization," *American Sociological Review*, 13:251-57 (1948); Jessie Bernard, "An Instrument for the Measurement of Neighboring with Experimental Application" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, 1935).

⁷Work on the scales was carried out co-operatively with Dr. Robert Schmidt, now with the University of Minnesota, Duluth Branch. Dr. Schmidt subsequently used the scales in some research conducted entirely within the St. Louis Metropolitan Area.

of Queen and Bernard, and other questions were added from suggestions by colleagues and from a review of the literature. Each of the sample of questions was tested for unidimensionality by the Guttman technique and each met the criteria of the Guttman schema and are hereinafter designated as scales.⁸

In this paper we are presenting the results of the research as applied to one area of interaction, the family. We divided the family into two areas for which we adopted the terms immediate family and extended family.⁹ The questions used in the final scale and the final weights given to the answers used from these scales are given below. Using these questions resulted in ten empirical scale types for the sample reported below.

SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT OF PARTICIPATION IN THE EXTENDED FAMILY¹⁰

1. How often do you visit in the homes of relatives whether here or elsewhere?

At least once a month	2
At least once a year but less than once a month	1
Less often than once a year	0

⁸ Louis Guttman, "The Cornell Technique of Scale and Intensity Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 7:247-79 (1947). These scales met all the requirements of the Guttman system. Reproducibility: Extended family .95, Immediate family .96; Predictability: Extended family .90, Immediate family .81. Predictability has not been given the emphasis of reproducibility, but it is implicit in Guttman's formulation. Predictability is the ratio of actual to possible errors. Acceptable levels of predictability are assumed to be .50. We are indebted to Dr. David B. Carpenter, of Washington University, for the analysis of predictability.

⁹ A note of caution should be introduced, however, with respect to that of the immediate family. While this scale met the requirements of the Guttman technique, there was an unusual concentration of cases in the upper scores, i.e., nine and ten. Almost two-thirds of all cases (240 of 357) were concentrated in these two scores. In dealing with a group such as the family this was not an unexpected distribution, but it would be desirable to continue work on this scale until questions could be selected which would increase the effective range.

While we are not here giving consideration to the important problem of item selection, we have considered the question at length in William H. Key, "Rural-Urban Social Participation" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, 1953), Ch. 2 and App. 2. We recognize that this selection of the particular items (questions) to be used is arbitrary and there may and probably will be disagreement with our particular selection of items. *Ex post facto* we recognize that some alternative selection of items might have been a more efficient one, e.g., the heavy concentration of cases in the two upper scores of the scale measuring participation in the immediate family restricts the effective range of the scale. However, if the theory behind the Guttman hypothesis is correct, the selection of a different sample of items would not affect the main relationships.

¹⁰ A relative was defined as any individual with whom a "blood" relationship was recognized or an individual who bore a recognized "blood" relationship to the informant's spouse if he or she were married.

2. How often do you engage in activities with relatives outside your homes?

At least once a month	1
Less often than once a month	0
3. How often do you borrow things from or lend things to relatives?

At least once a week	3
At least once a month but less than once a week	2
At least once a year but less than once a month	1
Less often than once a year	0
4. How often do you do favors other than lending for relatives?

At least once a week	3
At least once a month but less than once a week	2
At least once a year but less than once a month	1
Less often than once a year	0
5. Do you visit more with friends or relatives?

As much or more with relatives	1
More with friends	0

SCALE FOR MEASUREMENT OF PARTICIPATION
IN THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY¹¹

1. How often do you spend evenings at home with your immediate family when no outsiders are present?

Six or seven evenings a week	3
Three to five evenings a week	2
One or two evenings a week	1
Less than one evening a week	0
2. How often do you eat meals with at least one member of your immediate family?

Two or more meals a day	2
One meal a day	1
Less than one meal a day	0
3. How much of the average day during the work week do you spend with your immediate family?

One-half or more of the average day	2
One-fourth to one-half of the average day	1
Less than one-fourth	0

¹¹ The immediate family was defined as all individuals occupying a separate household and related by marriage or by "blood." Unattached individuals living in rooming houses were considered as constituting separate households.

4. How much of the average day do you spend with your family on weekends?

One-half or more	2
One-fourth to one-half	1
Less than one-fourth	0
5. How often do you engage in activities besides work away from home when no member of your immediate family is present?

Less than once a month	2
Once a month but not once a week	1
At least once a week	0
6. Does your family celebrate birthdays?

Sometimes or often	1
Never	0

The sample¹² consisting of 357 individuals, on which this study is based, was chosen from the Midwestern states. The population was subdivided into rural dwellers (those living in unincorporated places), village dwellers (incorporated places of less than 2500), residents of small towns (2500-25,000), of medium-sized cities (25,000-100,000) and of metropolitan areas (more than 100,000). One locality was chosen from each of these five categories. Localities were chosen on the basis of accessibility. Dwelling units within the localities were listed and numbered. A probability sample of dwelling units was chosen using a table of random numbers. Since the numbers of interviews in each of the subsamples was small we used rigorous controls and made return visits in the event a contact could not be made on the initial visit. Substitutions were allowed only in the event of a refusal on the part of the occupants or a vacancy. Refusals were few, comprising in total 3 per cent of those approached. Substitutions were made from a list of alternate households chosen by random numbers. We decided beforehand to divide our sample into 50 per cent male and 50 per cent female and predesignated the sex of the respondent to be interviewed in a given household. All adults (i.e., those over twenty years of age or married individuals fulfilling adult roles) of the predesignated sex were interviewed in a household. If the household contained no adults of the sex given,

¹² Details concerning the sample are available in Key, *op. cit.*, Ch. 2. Urbanism was defined demographically. For a similar definition and an exposition of reasons why the definition is in demographic rather than behavioral terms, see Stuart Queen and David Carpenter, *The American City* (McGraw-Hill, 1953), Chs. 2 and 3.

the adult head of the household was interviewed. For this reason we failed to achieve our balanced sex ratio.

The sample was compared to census data on sex, age, race, and schooling, and no significant difference was detected. Since age seemed so important to the subject under study the age-distributions in the several components of the sample were compared. The result showed that the sub-samples did not vary significantly among themselves in age distribution.

We also tested the relationship between social class and social participation. Since there is no one measure of social class available which permits ranking of individuals from such diverse areas, we chose two status measures, the Warner, "*Index of Status Character-*

TABLE 1. MEANS OF SCORES FOR PARTICIPATION WITH THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND PARTICIPATION WITH RELATIVES OUTSIDE THE IMMEDIATE FAMILY PRESENTED BY POPULATION GROUPS AND SEX

Population groups	<i>Immediate family</i>			<i>Extended family</i>		
	<i>total</i>	<i>male</i>	<i>female</i>	<i>total</i>	<i>male</i>	<i>female</i>
Rural	9.56	9.60	9.10	6.22	6.10	6.40
Village	7.86	8.73	7.42	5.19	5.20	5.19
Small Urban	8.10	8.73	8.08	5.50	6.40	5.04
Medium Sized City	8.37	8.78	8.08	5.92	6.00	5.91
Metropolitan Areas	8.51	9.20	8.20	5.87	7.00	5.25

istics" for the urban areas and the Sewell, "*Short Form of the Farm Family Social Status Scale*," for the rural areas. Correlations between these measures of socioeconomic status and our measures of social participation in either the immediate or extended family were consistently negative but not statistically significant.

A casual inspection of Table 1 is enough to indicate that there are no straight line trends from rural to urban. Of particular interest is the similarity of distribution of the mean scores for participation with relatives compared with the mean scores for immediate family participation.

I would like to emphasize two points in connection with these data: (1) the differences among the subsamples are significant only within the category female for participation in the immediate family, and (2) while the differences are not significant, except as previously

noted, the distribution in both cases is that of a "V" curve, with the low point coming in the village and small urban category, rather than the hypothesized straight line rural-urban relationship. Since these findings do not support the hypotheses advanced at the beginning of this article, I would like to advance an alternative hypothesis which may account for such findings.¹³

Let us recall that it has been commonly assumed that life in an urban area tended to pull families apart because of the diverse contacts, particularly those in secondary groups, which individuals have. As Wirth puts it, "The family as a unit of social life is emancipated from the larger kinship group characteristic of the country, and the individual members pursue their own diverging interests in their vocational, educational, religious, recreational, and political life."¹⁴ This view has not been substantiated for this sample, and there seems to us to be a more satisfactory explanation for our data. It is probable, in line with the theory of the effects of primary groups on personality, that any reduction in the number of satisfactory primary contacts makes those that remain seem more rather than less important.¹⁵ It is the difficulty of making satisfactory primary contacts outside the family that makes the immediate and extended family more important. In the urban areas are large numbers of people with whom persons have contact and the fleeting and specialized nature of these contacts mean that they cannot be of a primary nature and therefore completely satisfactory. In the rural area, spatial isolation tends to force association with one's family. It is the absence of either spatial or social isolation which could account for the relatively low rate of family interaction in the village and small

¹³ It is, of course, possible that significant differences would be found if a scale of sufficient discrimination could be developed, and it is certainly possible that there are unrecognized defects in study design and sampling. We are concerned about the size of the sample, especially in the village. In defense of the sample, however, it should be pointed out that (1) the universe from which the sample was chosen represented only adults, and therefore the size of the universe from which the sample was chosen was not as large in relation to sample size as first appears; (2) no substitutions in the sample were allowed. Each person was chosen before interviewing began, and recalls were made (sometimes as many as seven) until the interview was completed. We could have increased the size of the sample by a less rigorous procedure, but we preferred to be content with fewer cases rigorously chosen and personally interviewed.

¹⁴ Wirth, *op. cit.*, 44:1-24 (1938).

¹⁵ For an excellent criticism of the theory of the demise of primary groups in an urban environment, see Richard T. LaPiere, *A Theory of Social Control* (McGraw-Hill, 1954), especially pp. 9-24.

urban localities. In such a setting, intrafamilial contacts may be replaced by satisfactory contacts with friends of long standing, while the whole village or neighborhood takes on the characteristics of a primary group and isolation is at a minimum. From the standpoint of interaction, the family is less important in the village than in any other population grouping.¹⁸

In the case of the extended family, it is possible that there is a more special explanation for the emphasis on its disintegration in urban sociology. It seems likely (without doing extensive historical research) that the hypotheses of the disintegration of the extended family developed early in the history of urban sociology when attention was focused on recent immigrants to the city, and before these individuals had had an opportunity to establish families. In other words, while there might have been a noticeable lack of contact with relatives during and immediately following the period of greatest immigration to the city, this seems to have been a temporary phenomenon produced by migration rather than by the city as such, and when possible (i.e., after time had elapsed and immigrants had attracted more of their kin or had produced and reared children on their own), isolation in the city increased pressure for association with such kin.

It is recognized that the hypothesis advanced to account for the variations discovered needs further testing and that it will undoubtedly be modified as consideration is given to the related variables of ecological position and social status. However, *the problem of intracity difference was not the focal point in this study* but will probably be the focus of further research as will the relationship of frequency of participation to such variables as types of city, recency of immigration, period in the life cycle of the family and composition of the household. Our research was intended to test the simple hypothesis advanced at the beginning of this article and has indicated that, in the form in which it is usually presented, is it not supported by our findings.

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¹⁸ Readers interested in this point should consult the work done by Mel Spiro. Dr. Spiro reports research in a community in which the de-emphasis of the family has been carried to the extreme and in which most familial functions are carried on by the community rather than the family. See Melford Spiro, "Is the Family Universal?" *American Anthropologist*, 56:839-46 (Oct., 1954); and his *Children of the Kibbutz* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

BOOK REVIEWS

POLITICAL MAN. THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS. By Seymour Martin Lipset. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960. 432 pp. \$4.95.

PROFESSOR Lipset's book is an examination of the evidence to find (1) whether and how much the division into social classes affects current political decisions in elections; (2) whether and how much large modern labor unions are susceptible to non-democratic tendencies; (3) whether and how much certain social conditions are prone towards one or another political system; (4) whether and how much the struggle between class conflict and consensus and between democracy and bureaucracy contribute to establishing or maintaining a stable democracy.

Professor Lipset's concern is with the most desirable social situation, that is with the system of stable democracy. Certain preconditions must be met, though, before such a political system can function properly. So, for instance, a two-party system is better than a multi-party system and, of course, than a one-party system. And he favors an electoral institution based on regional rather than on proportional representation; here, of course, he is conscious of the fact that the British democracy—free of the conformism required by regionalism—is as stable as any democracy can possibly be although it is based on electoral proportional representation. Similarly, Lipset prefers federalism to a unitary state. Contributing to democratic stability are the cross-cutting social cleavages between classes so that not all issues are decided along

party lines and also the wide flexibility of the two parties to accommodate factions and opinions originating from various class levels. This fact, exemplified by the seeming paradox of the conservative Democratic South and the liberal section of Northern Republicans in this country, contributes to the vitality of democracy, which as a central European statesman once observed is equivalent to discussions. This statement, in other words, is a democratic translation of the class struggle.

One of the indispensable but not sufficient forces for a stable democracy is a politically sophisticated voter. In his study of fascist movements—right, center, and left—Lipset makes a point of this. Of course, political sophistication is influenced by the general educational level of the population and its psychological bearing. Lipset finds that population segments or strata conditioned to isolation and a lack of interclass communication are likely to vote radical and left if they are workers or radical and right if they are middle class. For instance, in his analysis of voting behavior in the western democracies Lipset finds that one-crop farmers, fishermen, longshoremen, sheep-shearers, miners, and lumbermen tend to vote left (and radical) because of their relatively low interclass communication and high intraclass or intra-group communication. Living in isolated communities, their "class-con-

siousness" is intensified and their common fate—the relative insecurity of their occupation or enterprise—forces them to place political priority on their economic and social needs in their voting behavior. On the other hand, Lipset finds that the service classes or strata, because of their dispersion among other classes and because of their high interclass communication possibilities and their low intraclass contacts, are politically apathetic and eventually conservative by "differential association." The needs accompanying voting left—or rather causing it—are the need for security of income, the need for satisfying work and the need for status, social recognition, and freedom from social discrimination. These needs become more pronounced in a society where equality and egalitarianism form the ideological superstructure, and where, therefore, they are, theoretically at least, realizable.

In studying the voting behavior in counties affected by a form of fascism sometime in the recent past, and in noting movements like populism in this country and *l'affaire McCarthy*, Lipset brings evidence of the fact that middle classes which do not have access to occupational or entrepreneurial security and to sophisticated political information are those which tend to support extremist movements to the right. All extremist movements, left or right, have much in common: "they appeal to the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated, and authoritarian persons at every level of society" (p. 175). But social systems advocated by the extremists right and left differ in their concern for consensus and participation of the masses. While conservative dictatorships or oligarchies remain relatively unconcerned about the political participation of their subjects, totalitarian regimes—and here

communist far more than fascist—become irritated by the political apathy and lack of enthusiasm of the masses.

About one-half of *Political Man* is devoted to politics at home. Lipset re-analyzed the electoral outcomes of the last 150 years, on occasions studying the ballot returns of individual counties. His major finding is the confirmation of the theory that voting occurs along class lines with necessary exceptions, of course. Modern studies of class structure in American society have tended to foster the myth of one large middle class, the myth of a status society instead of a class society, and the myth of the identity of the two parties. Lipset finds that working classes still tend to vote in large majority for the Democrats and middle and upper classes for the Republicans, although the middle classes form the stratum which determines the outcome of the national elections one way or the other. Trade unions play a role in politics as they support the Democrats and secure thus the majority of the working class votes for this party. In a country like the United States certainly nobody would expect a well patterned socio-political structure. The seeming anomalies of Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans are not really anomalies. A closer look shows that even there and on individual issues class lines are followed. And in the cases where it is not so, as in one-party regions, explanations come readily. In a one-party region those likely to enter a political career are absorbed into the standing apparatus which in turn has to accommodate a wide range of views in order to keep its monopoly. Thus a conservative Democrat and a liberal Republican are many times theoretically identical although traditional party affiliations are stronger than the issues. But in general, it should be repeated, even in this country class adherence is the major determinant of voting behavior.

As an advocate of the principle of stable democracy, Lipset contemplates with some concern the development of American labor. Unions are usually a "one-party system" and the larger they get and the less status-carrying the occupation of their workers is, the more authoritarian or even totalitarian they tend to become. And in a country where labor commands large resources of the population, there is a potential—of course not very imminent—danger of a spilling over (of the one-party system) into other major national institutions which would convert the stable democracy into an unstable one prone to dictatorship. As much as we know about institutions, we expect that with the growing size of trade union operation on a national or international level there is an almost Parkinsonian increase of bureaucratic establishment, and the structure formalizes to a top-level decision-making organization which in turn weakens the democratic participation of the rank-and-file membership in the decision processes. For

instance, the union of typographers, being composed of elite workers and not very centralized, shows a far greater independence of the locals than, say, the steel unions. Definitely, the "responsibilities" assumed by unions toward management in collective bargaining become feedback in the form of restrictions on individual decisions on the local level. Lipset's contention on this point is that "the drive to limit the functions and goals of unions may be primarily the adaptive mechanism of a security seeking leadership rather than a result of the social situation of workers" (p. 392).

To conclude, one may say that as long, then, as there is a differentiation between need-orientation and need-fulfillment on a social class basis, some tensions are bound to arise when the regular channels providing for their outlet become outworn and anachronistic.

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SOCIAL CHANGE IN RURAL SOCIETY. By Everett M. Rogers. *New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1960. xi, 490 pp. \$6.75.*

THE title on the cover of this book might lead a prospective reader to expect a treatise on social change. Instead, he will find a new introductory text in rural sociology.

Three salient features may be noticed in this book. First is its claim of being a response to a "mandate" from its potential users. Second is its central theme of the changing nature of rural society. And third is the author's explicit recognition of his audience and his consequent attempt to communicate with them in their own language.

The "mandate" came from a study, referred to by the author in the Preface, which obtained data from 77 American colleges and universities offering introductory rural sociology

courses in 1958. The teachers of these courses were asked to suggest improvements in the content of texts for the introductory courses in the field. Six suggestions from this study were used by the author as guides in the preparation of his text. They called for (1) the elimination of the concepts of "conflict," "co-operation," and "accommodation," along with the emphasis on numbers as in relation to population and farm size; (2) wider coverage of rural nonfarm life; (3) the inclusion of more sociological principles and concepts; (4) the reduction of regional bias; (5) more extensive treatment of rural society in other countries; and (6) the inclusion of more material on culture and personality. The attempt

to implement these suggestions has resulted in coverage and emphases rather different from some of the current texts.

Part I, the Introduction, discusses the changing rural society, and the field of rural sociology. Part II gives the sociological background, including discussion of culture, personality, social change, groups, bureaucracy, and social stratification. Part III treats rural institutions in action, and includes, among other things, the suburban community, the business of farming, and rather extensive treatments of farmer organizations and government agricultural agencies. The last part considers rural social problems, the communication of agricultural technology, agricultural adjustment, and rural sociologists and development abroad. The text is concluded by a look at the future of rural society through the examination of regions in the United States, their changes and trends.

The selection of the central theme of the book was also based upon the aforementioned study. The finding was that "the most common purpose for introductory rural sociology courses is to emphasize the study of *social change in rural society*."

In recognizing his audience, the author notes that most of the students who take introductory rural sociology courses are not majoring in the field, will not take further courses in it, and

"less than half will have previously enrolled in a course in principles of sociology." He tries to communicate with these people, not with professional rural sociologists. This accounts for some of the changes in coverage as well as for readability.

The reader of this book may find some statements and emphases which appear to be a little misleading or contradictory. He may wonder if the regularity and continuity upon which a science of society must depend is obscured by a preoccupation with change. He may want to question some of the guidelines of the "mandate" which orient the work, and how completely the text answers some of them. He may find that definitions of concepts sometimes convey little information.

On the other hand, there are a number of points which can be well appreciated. Among them are the following. Visual and verbal illustrations are liberally and interestingly used. The labels on the pictures and figures are followed by summary explanations. Numerous reading excerpts are included and are followed by brief interpretive conclusions. There is a list of definitions at the back of the book. And the book is readable, understandable, and interesting. It will very likely communicate with the audience for which it is intended.

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THE RELIGION OF JAVA. By Clifford Geertz. *Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960.*

THE RELIGION OF JAVA is the first of a proposed series on contemporary Javanese life, based on research sponsored by The Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is an ethnographic report of the author's observations during sixteen months of field work in "Mod-

jokuto," a small (*sic*) town of some 20,000 inhabitants in east central Java. The report is well written and interesting enough to one who is motivated by his own curiosity about the behavior of other peoples. Students of comparative religion, religious diffusion, religion and social life in general, and

religion and politics in particular will find much of value to them in Dr. Geertz's study, although it is doubtful that very many casual readers will be sufficiently gripped by it to pursue it to the end.

Incidentally, I take Modjokuto to be a fictitious name, since Dr. Geertz encloses it in quotation marks the first time he uses it and since I can find no such town on the map. I must confess to some mild surprise that ethnographers persist in using this device, since if the study attracts attention there is little chance that the anonymity of the community will be long preserved, and if it doesn't nobody cares much anyway.

The religion of Java is Islam, which claims some 90 per cent of the population as adherents, at least nominally. The remaining 10 per cent, who are Christians, Buddhists, and other non-Moslems, do not figure significantly in the study. There are three major variants of Islam: the *abangans* who, though nominally Moslems, do not practice the Five Pillars of the Faith, although they repeat certain Islamic prayers and creeds by rote, and who remain predominantly pagan in belief and practice; the *santris*, who do practice the Five Pillars, observing the prescribed times for prayers and fasts, and who even make the traditional pilgrimage to Mecca; and the *prijajis* who, though nominally Moslems, are predominantly Hindu-Buddhistic in belief and practice. These three variants follow class lines after a fashion—the *abangans* corresponding roughly to peasants and the *prijajis* to nobility (a "white-collar" nobility, Geertz calls them, because of the positions they held in the Dutch administrative system prior to the Republic), with the *santris* forming a middle class of artisans and traders between them. These three variants are integrated at one level, the traditional, by the *slametan*—a ritual "feast"—which is a carry-over from

paganism, at another level, the ideological, by a common (nominal) adherence to the worship of Allah, and at a third level, the modern, by the shared awareness of a common national destiny.

The formal practice of Islamic worship is confined almost entirely to the *santris*, who constitute roughly one-third of the population of Modjokuto, and who stand aloof in many respects from the other two-thirds, with their own political parties, schools, and other community organizations, much as Catholics do in America. Among the *abangans* and *prijajis* the terminology of Islam is prevalent, but the form and the content are largely absent. At this point one cannot help but wish that Dr. Geertz had proposed a theoretical framework for the analysis of religious behavior in Java, for although one gets, undoubtedly, the "feeling" or general overview, much is left unexplained. It is similar to saying that Americans are Christians of various degrees who constitute a common religious tradition because of their common celebration of Thanksgiving Day, their nominal belief in God, and their participation in American civic and political life.

This study contributes much to our knowledge about the religious behavior of the Javanese, but the temptation to generalize is too great. It requires a set of assumptions to present the religious life of fewer than .04 per cent of the population of Java—and that in a rather unimportant town, somewhat off the beaten path—as typical of all religious life in Java. These assumptions are not made explicit, nor is any attempt made to demonstrate that the sample is representative of the whole. And without any theoretical guide lines, not even a definition of religion, the problem of what to include and what to exclude is not adequately dealt with. Consequently much is included which, in my opin-

ion, might have been excluded. If one may argue that the title of such a report should be in some sense descriptive of its content, then *Religion and Politics in Modjokuto* would seem to be more adequate, since the main burden of the report and the major impression it left on the reviewer is the close interrelationship between these two aspects of life in a Javanese town. Religion, according to the author, is in a state of flux in Modjokuto. Its future

destiny will be largely determined by political events that are now in the making.

The editor of the series promises that the remaining volumes in the series will provide a fuller and more balanced view of Javanese society. It is to be hoped that they will fill some of the gaps left by this one.

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THEORETICAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON. *New York: The Social Science Research Council, 230 Park Avenue, 1960. 146 pp. \$1.50.*

THE PROBATION OFFICER INVESTIGATES. A GUIDE TO THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. By Paul W. Keve. *Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960. 178 pp. \$4.50.*

THE Social Science Research Council study grew out of a series of bi-monthly conferences held during 1956 and in the spring of 1957. The plan and purpose of the conferences were set out in advance. The discussions centered on research projects carried out by the conference participants. The projects dealt with special areas of the broad field of prison social organization theory.

The contributors to this study (Richard A. Cloward, Donald R. Cressey, George H. Grossen, Richard McClury, Lloyd E. Ohlin, Gresham M. Sykes, Sheldon L. Messinger, and Frank E. Hartung who was the original mover of the conference) are known for their conspicuously good works in practical sociology and corrections. This present work is not disappointing.

The book is not a survey of the complex and speculative problems running the entire compass of prison organization. It is something much more useful. It is a presentation of the results of a "critical examination . . . [and] . . . an intensive scrutiny of a few areas . . ."

This reviewer thinks the areas selected needed "critical examination." They are the Inmate Social System, Social Control of the Prison, Communication Patterns as Basis of Systems of Authority, Limitations on Organization of Treatment in the Modern Prison, Conflicting Interests in Correctional Objectives, External Setting and Internal Relations of the Prison.

The research papers are not included as originally presented. What is contained "is the precipitate of the . . . reports modified by discussion and criticism."

The material is well integrated. What is more, the authors have succeeded in giving the presentation a welcome coherency and continuity of style.

The primary concern of *The Probation Officer Investigates* is rehabilitation. The major theme is good report writing. The author writes from the vantage point of one who is a successful practitioner in the field of probation and parole. He believes that the success or failure of parole in each individual case rests not alone upon the

probationer. The behavioral history of the probationer and his readiness for parole are important; but unless the probation officer can translate a constructive penal (correctional?) philosophy into his daily tasks he will fail in the critical test.

The parole officer's real constructive work begins with the investigation of the offender in advance of his appearance before the trial court. The ability to write "comprehensive and analytical reports . . . for the use of the court" is an indispensable requisite. Indeed, successful rehabilitation may depend upon it. The court must know what the officer knows and thinks about the accused. It should not be asked to plough through a mass of unintelligible verbiage. This matter of report writing involves a personal philosophy and a

technique. And it requires also a concentrated and sympathetically attached interest.

This is a welcome book. This reviewer finds it difficult to imagine a better one on the same subject. Every page is an exemplification of the author's defense of clear, concise, intelligible, and warm report writing.

The book deals with confidentiality: a cherished practice and a liability; the defense attorney: he can be helpful to the probation officer; the interview: there is a way and a place.

The projects include also identifying data, the offense and the offender, the family, religion, education, employer, and health.

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THE INTELLECTUALS: A CONTROVERSIAL PORTRAIT. Edited by George B. de Huszer. *Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960. \$7.50.*

THIS handsome volume is not a systematic treatise on intellectuals but a collection of essays by and about intellectuals. The only limitation on subjects included in this volume was authors who wrote since the French Revolution and discussions by more recent authors of works by intellectuals who wrote after 1789. This limitation is the result of the fact that the modern intellectual appeared first in the latter half of the eighteenth century in western Europe.

The central theme of intellectuals is treated from many points of view by authors from the arts, the humanities, and the natural and social sciences. The editor has organized these sixty-eight essays into topical divisions each of which is introduced by the editor's overview: emergence of modern intellectuals, nature of intellectuals, types of intellectuals, role of the intellectual, intellectuals and modern ideologies, and intellectuals in various countries.

The discursive quality of the book stems from the inclusion of three different kinds of essays: by litterateurs, by ideologues, and by writers concerned to show a relationship between the intellectual, his writings, and his social-historical context.

The litterateurs have written either insightful essays in the history of ideas of intellectuals or genteel scoldings of their generational peers for maintaining an allegiance to a party or class at the expense of intellectual detachment. In these categories are Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Emerson, Ortega y Gasset, Barzun, Tate, Eliot, Kirk, Buckeley, and Viereck.

The ideologues, true to the scholarly tradition of eighteenth-century enlightenment, use illustrations drawn from history to plead their view of the proper role of the intellectual in reconstructing society. Gorky, Kautsky, Lafarque, and Stalin.

A measure of the value of this book

to a sociologist is the large number of essays devoted to analysis of the role of the intellectual as related to a particular time and place. The problem of the definition of the intellectual is treated by Znaniecki, Mannheim, Schumpeter, and John Lukas. Riesman and Lipset point out the gap between the presumed and actual status of the contemporary American intellectual. Alienation of intellectuals from the values of the "business class" in American society is treated by Hook, Rosenberg, Hayek, von Mises, and MacLeisch. Shils, in an outstanding essay, outlines the major intellectual traditions and explains their content in terms of the relations of the intellectual to those in authority. The same frame of reference is used by de Tocqueville for eighteenth-century French men of letters; by Seton-Watson for nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Russian intelligentsia; by Stokes for *pensadores* of Latin America; by Padkye for Asian intellectuals; and Liithy, Mann, and Spender for west European intellectuals.

Neglect of the role of intellectuals by contemporary American social scientists in comparison to the attention given to this role by Europeans is striking.

One reason may be the Marxian flavor of most European treatments of this problem which makes it suspect for many American social scientists. Examples would be Engels' literary attempts to legitimize the role of the intellectual particularly in relation to the efforts of the "vulgar" Marxists to portray the intellectual as inevitably an ideologist; the massive literary ruminations of the English Fabians concerning their relations with the

people; and the recent literary records of the counterconversions of Crossman, Gide, Silone, Koestler, and others.

Another reason is that contemporary intellectuals in the United States and western Europe are not viewed by the social scientist as a socially unlocated group, as Karl Mannheim thought intellectuals should be or Stalin implied by attempting to fit them into a society of only peasants and workers, nor are they regarded as a structurally located group. Rarely is "intellectual" viewed as a meaningful way of categorizing a segment of the population. If Schumpeter's definition of the intellectual as an individual who wields the power of the spoken and written word and has no direct responsibility for practical affairs is acceptable, then intellectuals can be located only in the administrative apparatus of public or private bureaucracies or as teachers, scholars, and academic technicians in colleges and universities. Given these locations, intellectuals become subject to the institutional pressures and "perspectives" of their place of work. We then study these men not as intellectuals but as units in Theodore Caplow's "Academic Marketplace," or as judicial spokesmen in Williard Hurst's "The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers," or as guides to our views on public policy in Leo Rosten's, "The Washington Correspondent."

This well edited book should help to quicken current interest in cross-cultural comparison and to widen the rather narrow institutional limits within which we view the intellectual.

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